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# 1NC Speech

**Government reform masks more insidious surveillance, this turns the affirmative**

**Giroux 14**

Henry A., Global TV Network Chair Professor at McMaster University in the English and Cultural Studies Department and a Distinguished Visiting Professor at Ryerson University, “Totalitarian Paranoia in the Post-Orwellian Surveillance State,” Truthout, 10 February 2014, <http://www.truth-out.org/opinion/item/21656-totalitarian-paranoia-in-the-post-orwellian-surveillance-state>

Everything that moves is monitored, along with information that is endlessly amassed and stored by private and government agencies. No one, it seems, can escape the tentacles of the NSA or the spy agencies that are scouring mobile phone apps for personal data and intercepting computer and cellphone shipments to plant tracking devices and malware in them.11 Surveillance is now global, reaching beyond borders that no longer provide an obstacle to collecting information and spying on governments, individuals, prominent politicians, corporations and pro-democracy protest groups. The details of our daily lives are not only on full display but are being monitored, collected and stored in databanks waiting to be used for commercial, security or political purposes. At the same time, the right to privacy is eagerly given up by millions of people for the wonders of social networking or the varied seductions inspired by consumer fantasies. The loss of privacy, anonymity and confidentiality also has had the adverse effect of providing the basis for what Bauman and David Lyons call the undemocratic process of "social sorting," in which different populations are subject to differential treatment extending from being protected by the state to being killed by drone attacks launched under the auspices of global surveillance and state power.12

Privacy is no longer a principled and cherished civil right. On the contrary, it has been absorbed and transformed within the purview of a celebrity and market-driven culture in which people publicize themselves and their innermost secrets to promote and advance their personal brand. Or it is often a principle invoked by conservatives who claim their rights to privacy have been trampled when confronted with ideas or arguments that unsettle their notions of common sense or their worldviews. It is worth repeating that privacy has mostly become synonymous with a form of self-generated, nonstop performance - a type of public relations in which privacy makes possible the unearthing of secrets, a cult of commodified confessionals and an infusion of narcissistic, self-referencing narratives, all of which serve to expand the pleasure quotient of surveillance while normalizing its expanding practices and modes of repression that Orwell could never have imagined. Where Orwell's characters loathed the intrusion of surveillance, according to Bauman and Lyons, today

We seem to experience no joy in having secrets, unless they are the kinds of secrets likely to enhance our egos by attracting the attention of researchers and editors of TV talk shows, tabloid front pages and the....covers of glossy magazines….Everything private is now done, potentially, in public - and is potentially available for public consumption; and remains available for the duration, till the end of time, as the internet 'can't be made to forget' anything once recorded on any of its innumerable servers. This erosion of anonymity is a product of pervasive social media services, cheap cell phone cameras, free photo and video Web hosts, and perhaps most important of all, a change in people's views about what ought to be public and what ought to be private.13

Orwell's 1984 looks subdued next to the current parameters, intrusions, technologies and disciplinary apparatuses wielded by the new corporate-government surveillance state. Surveillance has not only become more pervasive, intruding into the most private of spaces and activities in order to collect massive amounts of data, it also permeates and inhabits everyday activities so as to be taken-for-granted. Surveillance is not simply pervasive, it has become normalized. Orwell could not have imagined either the intrusive capabilities of the the new high-powered digital technologies of surveillance and display, nor could he have envisioned the growing web of political, cultural and economic partnerships between modes of government and corporate sovereignty capable of collecting almost every form of communication in which human beings engage. What is new in the post-Orwellian world is not just the emergence of new and powerful technologies used by governments and corporations to spy on people and assess personal information as a way to either attract ready-made customers or to sell information to advertising agencies, but the emergence of a widespread culture of surveillance. Intelligence networks now inhabit the world of Disney as well as the secret domains of the NSA and the FBI.

I think the renowned intellectual historian Quentin Skinner is right in insisting that surveillance is about more than the violation of privacy rights, however important. Under the surveillance state, the greatest threat one faces is not simply the violation of one's right to privacy, but the fact that the public is subject to the dictates of arbitrary power it no longer seems interested in contesting. And it is precisely this existence of unchecked power and the wider culture of political indifference that puts at risk the broader principles of liberty and freedom, which are fundamental to democracy itself. According to Skinner, who is worth quoting at length: The response of those who are worried about surveillance has so far been too much couched, it seems to me, in terms of the violation of the right to privacy. Of course it's true that my privacy has been violated if someone is reading my emails without my knowledge. But my point is that my liberty is also being violated, and not merely by the fact that someone is reading my emails but also by the fact that someone has the power to do so should they choose. We have to insist that this in itself takes away liberty because it leaves us at the mercy of arbitrary power. It's no use those who have possession of this power promising that they won't necessarily use it, or will use it only for the common good. What is offensive to liberty is the very existence of such arbitrary power.14

# 1NC Speech

**Your reform is a biopolitical protection of life itself. This type of thinking perpetuates structural violence, racism, and global civil war - Value to life comes first, only way to avoid biopolitics**

**Evans 10** [Brad Evans, Lecturer in the School of Politics and International Studies at the University of Leeds and Programme Director for International Relations, “Foucault’s Legacy: Security, War, and Violence in the 21st Century,” Security Dialogue vol.41, no. 4, August 2010, pg. 422-424, sage]

Imposing liberalism has often come at a price. That price has tended to be a continuous recourse to war. While the militarism associated with liberal internationalization has already received scholarly attention (Howard, 2008), Foucault was concerned more with the continuation of war once peace has been declared.4 Denouncing the illusion that ‘we are living in a world in which order and peace have been restored’ (Foucault, 2003: 53), he set out to disrupt the neat distinctions between times of war/military exceptionalism and times of peace/civic normality. War accordingly now appears to condition the type of peace that follows. None have been more ambitious in map-­ ping out this war–peace continuum than Michael Dillon & Julian Reid (2009). Their ‘liberal war’ thesis provides a provocative insight into the lethality of making live. Liberalism today, they argue, is underwritten by the unreserved righteousness of its mission. Hence, while there may still be populations that exist beyond the liberal pale, it is now taken that they should be included. With ‘liberal peace’ therefore predicated on the pacification/elimination of all forms of political difference in order that liberalism might meet its own moral and political objectives, the more peace is commanded, the more war is declared in order to achieve it: ‘In proclaiming peace . . . liberals are nonetheless committed also to making war.’ This is the ‘martial face of liberal power’ that, contrary to the familiar narrative, is ‘directly fuelled by the universal and pacific ambitions for which liberalism is to be admired’ (Dillon & Reid, 2009: 2). Liberalism thus stands accused here of universalizing war in its pursuit of peace: However much liberalism abjures war, indeed finds the instrumental use of war, especially, a scandal, war has always been as instrumental to liberal as to geopolitical thinkers. In that very attempt to instrumentalize, indeed universalize, war in the pursuit of its own global project of emancipation, the practice of liberal rule itself becomes profoundly shaped by war. However much it may proclaim liberal peace and freedom, its own allied commitment to war subverts the very peace and freedoms it proclaims (Dillon & Reid, 2009: 7). While Dillon & Reid’s thesis only makes veiled reference to the onto-­ theological dimension, they are fully aware that its rule depends upon a certain religiosity in the sense that war has now been turned into a veritable human crusade with only two possible outcomes: ‘endless war or the transformation of other societies and cultures into liberal societies and cul-­ tures’ (Dillon & Reid, 2009: 5). Endless war is underwritten here by a new set of problems. Unlike Clausewitzean confrontations, which at least provided the strategic comforts of clear demarcations (them/us, war/peace, citizen/soldier, and so on), these wars no longer benefit from the possibility of scoring outright victory, retreating, or achieving a lasting negotiated peace by means of political compromise. Indeed, deprived of the prospect of defining enmity in advance, war itself becomes just as complex, dynamic, adaptive and radically interconnected as the world of which it is part. That is why ‘any such war to end war becomes a war without end. . . . The project of removing war from the life of the species becomes a lethal and, in principle, continuous and unending process’ (Dillon & Reid, 2009: 32). Duffield, building on from these concerns, takes this unending scenario a stage further to suggest that since wars for humanity are inextricably bound to the global life-­chance divide, it is now possible to write of a ‘Global Civil War’ into which all life is openly recruited: Each crisis of global circulation . . . marks out a terrain of global civil war, or rather a tableau of wars, which is fought on and between the modalities of life itself. . . . What is at stake in this war is the West’s ability to contain and manage international poverty while maintaining the ability of mass society to live and consume beyond its means (Duffield, 2008: 162). Setting out civil war in these terms inevitably marks an important depar-­ ture. Not only does it illustrate how liberalism gains its mastery by posing fundamental questions of life and death – that is, who is to live and who can be killed – disrupting the narrative that ordinarily takes sovereignty to be the point of theoretical departure, civil war now appears to be driven by a globally ambitious biopolitical imperative (see below). Liberals have continuously made reference to humanity in order to justify their use of military force (Ignatieff, 2003). War, if there is to be one, must be for the unification of the species. This humanitarian caveat is by no means out of favour. More recently it underwrites the strategic rethink in contemporary zones of occupation, which has become biopolitical (‘hearts and minds’) in everything but name (Kilcullen, 2009; Smith, 2006). While criticisms of these strategies have tended to focus on the naive dangers associated with liberal idealism (see Gray, 2008), insufficient attention has been paid to the contested nature of all the tactics deployed in the will to govern illiberal populations. Foucault returns here with renewed vigour. He understood that forms of war have always been aligned with forms of life. Liberal wars are no exception. Fought in the name of endangered humanity, humanity itself finds its most meaningful expression through the battles waged in its name: At this point we can invert Clausewitz’s proposition and say that politics is the continuation of war by other means. . . . While it is true that political power puts an end to war and establishes or attempts to establish the reign of peace in civil society, it certainly does not do so in order to suspend the effects of power or to neutralize the disequilibrium revealed in the last battle of war (Foucault, 2003: 15). What in other words occurs beneath the semblance of peace is far from politically settled: political struggles, these clashes over and with power, these modifications of relations of force – the shifting balances, the reversals – in a political system, all these things must be interpreted as a continuation of war. And they are interpreted as so many episodes, fragmentations, and displacements of the war itself. We are always writing the history of the same war, even when we are writing the history of peace and its institutions (Foucault, 2003: 15). David Miliband (2009), without perhaps knowing the full political and philo-­ sophical implications, appears to subscribe to the value of this approach, albeit for an altogether more committed deployment: NATO was born in the shadow of the Cold War, but we have all had to change our thinking as our troops confront insurgents rather than military machines like our own. The mental models of 20th century mass warfare are not fit for 21st century counterinsurgency. That is why my argument today has been about the centrality of politics. People like quoting Clausewitz that warfare is the continuation of politics by other means. . . . We need politics to become the continuation of warfare by other means. Miliband’s ‘Foucauldian moment’ should not escape us. Inverting Clausewitz on a planetary scale – hence promoting the collapse of all meaningful distinctions that once held together the fixed terms of Newtonian space (i.e. inside/outside, friend/enemy, citizen/soldier, war/peace, and so forth), he firmly locates the conflict among the world of peoples. With global war there-­ fore appearing to be an internal state of affairs, vanquishing enemies can no longer be sanctioned for the mere defence of things. A new moment has arrived, in which the destiny of humanity as a whole is being wagered on the success of humanity’s own political strategies. No coincidence, then, that authors like David Kilcullen – a key architect in the formulation of counterinsurgency strategies in Iraq and Afghanistan, argue for a global insurgency paradigm without too much controversy. Viewed from the perspective of power, global insurgency is after all nothing more than the advent of a global civil war fought for the biopolitical spoils of life. Giving primacy to counter-­ insurgency, it foregrounds the problem of populations so that questions of security governance (i.e. population regulation) become central to the war effort (RAND, 2008). Placing the managed recovery of maladjusted life into the heart of military strategies, it insists upon a joined-­up response in which sovereign/militaristic forms of ordering are matched by biopolitical/devel-­ opmental forms of progress (Bell & Evans, forthcoming). Demanding in other words a planetary outlook, it collapses the local into the global so that life’s radical interconnectivity implies that absolutely nothing can be left to chance. While liberals have therefore been at pains to offer a more humane recovery to the overt failures of military excess in current theatres of operation, warfare has not in any way been removed from the species. Instead, humanized in the name of local sensitivities, doing what is necessary out of global species necessity now implies that war effectively takes place by every means. Our understanding of civil war is invariably recast. Sovereignty has been the traditional starting point for any discussion of civil war. While this is a well-established Eurocentric narrative, colonized peoples have never fully accepted the inevitability of the transfixed utopian prolificacy upon which sovereign power increasingly became dependent. Neither have they been completely passive when confronted by colonialism’s own brand of warfare by other means. Foucault was well aware of this his-­ tory. While Foucauldian scholars can therefore rightly argue that alternative histories of the subjugated alone permit us to challenge the monopolization of political terms – not least ‘civil war’ – for Foucault in particular there was something altogether more important at stake: there is no obligation whatsoever to ensure that reality matches some canonical theory. Despite what some scholars may insist, politically speaking there is nothing that is necessarily proper to the sovereign method. It holds no distinct privilege. Our task is to use theory to help make sense of reality, not vice versa. While there is not the space here to engage fully with the implications of our global civil war paradigm, it should be pointed out that since its biopolitical imperative removes the inevitability of epiphenomenal tensions, nothing and nobody is necessarily dangerous simply because location dictates. With enmity instead depending upon the complex, adaptive, dynamic account of life itself, what becomes dangerous emerges from within the liberal imaginary of threat. Violence accordingly can only be sanctioned against those newly appointed enemies of humanity – a phrase that, immeasurably greater than any juridical category, necessarily affords enmity an internal quality inherent to the species complete, for the sake of planetary survival. Vital in other words to all human existence, doing what is necessary out of global species necessity requires a new moral assay of life that, pitting the universal against the particular, willingly commits violence against any ontological commitment to political difference, even though universality itself is a shallow disguise for the practice of destroying political adversaries through the contingency of particular encounters. Necessary Violence Having established that the principal task set for biopolitical practitioners is to sort and adjudicate between the species, modern societies reveal a distinct biopolitical aporia (an irresolvable political dilemma) in the sense that making life live – selecting out those ways of life that are fittest by design – inevitably writes into that very script those lives that are retarded, backward, degenerate, wasteful and ultimately dangerous to the social order (Bauman, 1991). Racism thus appears here to be a thoroughly modern phenomenon (Deleuze & Guattari, 2002). This takes us to the heart of our concern with biopolitical rationalities. When ‘life itself’ becomes the principal referent for political struggles, power necessarily concerns itself with those biological threats to human existence (Palladino, 2008). That is to say, since life becomes the author of its own (un)making, the biopolitical assay of life necessarily portrays a commitment to the supremacy of certain species types: ‘a race that is portrayed as the one true race, the race that holds power and is entitled to define the norm, and against those who deviate from that norm, against those who pose a threat to the biological heritage’ (Foucault, 2003: 61). Evidently, what is at stake here is no mere sovereign affair. Epiphenomenal tensions aside, racial problems occupy a ‘permanent presence’ within the political order (Foucault, 2003: 62). Biopolitically speaking, then, since it is precisely through the internalization of threat – the constitution of the threat that is now from the dangerous ‘Others’ that exist within – that societies reproduce at the level of life the ontological commitment to secure the subject, since everybody is now possibly dangerous and nobody can be exempt, for political modernity to function one always has to be capable of killing in order to go on living: Wars are no longer waged in the name of a sovereign who must be defended; they are waged on behalf of the existence of everyone; entire populations are mobilized for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name of life necessity; massacres have become vital. . . . The principle underlying the tactics of battle – that one has to become capable of killing in order to go on living – has become the principle that defines the strategy of states (Foucault, 1990: 137). When Foucault refers to ‘killing’, he is not simply referring to the vicious act of taking another life: ‘When I say “killing”, I obviously do not mean simply murder as such, but also every form of indirect murder: the fact of exposing someone to death, increasing the risk of death for some people, or, quite simply, political death, expulsion, rejection and so on’ (Foucault, 2003: 256). Racism makes this process of elimination possible, for it is only through the discourse and practice of racial (dis)qualification that one is capable of introducing ‘a break in the domain of life that is under power’s control: the break between what must live and what must die’ (Foucault, 2003: 255). While kill- ing does not need to be physically murderous, that is not to suggest that we should lose sight of the very real forms of political violence that do take place in the name of species improvement. As Deleuze (1999: 76) duly noted, when notions of security are invoked in order to preserve the destiny of a species, when the defence of society gives sanction to very real acts of violence that are justified in terms of species necessity, that is when the capacity to legitimate murderous political actions in all our names and for all our sakes becomes altogether more rational, calculated, utilitarian, hence altogether more frightening: When a diagram of power abandons the model of sovereignty in favour of a disciplinary model, when it becomes the ‘bio-­power’ or ‘bio-­politics’ of populations, controlling and administering life, it is indeed life that emerges as the new object of power. At that point law increasingly renounces that symbol of sovereign privilege, the right to put someone to death, but allows itself to produce all the more hecatombs and genocides: not by returning to the old law of killing, but on the contrary in the name of race, precious space, conditions of life and the survival of a population that believes itself to be better than its enemy, which it now treats not as the juridical enemy of the old sovereign but as a toxic or infectious agent, a sort of ‘biological danger’. Auschwitz arguably represents the most grotesque, shameful and hence meaningful example of necessary killing – the violence that is sanctioned in the name of species necessity (see Agamben, 1995, 2005). Indeed, for Agamben, since one of the most ‘essential characteristics’ of modern biopolitics is to constantly ‘redefine the threshold in life that distinguishes and separates what is inside from what is outside’, it is within those sites that ‘eliminate radically the people that are excluded’ that the biopolitical racial imperative is exposed in its most brutal form (Agamben, 1995: 171). The camp can therefore be seen to be the defining paradigm of the modern insomuch as it is a ‘space in which power confronts nothing other than pure biological life without any media-­ tion’ (Agamben, 1995: 179). While lacking Agamben’s intellectual sophistry, such a Schmittean-­inspired approach to violence – that is, sovereignty as the ability to declare a state of juridical exception – has certainly gained wide-­ spread academic currency in recent times. The field of international relations, for instance, has been awash with works that have tried to theorize the ‘exceptional times’ in which we live (see, in particular, Devetak, 2007; Kaldor, 2007). While some of the tactics deployed in the ‘Global War on Terror’ have undoubtedly lent credibility to these approaches, in terms of understanding violence they are limited. Violence is only rendered problematic here when it is associated with some act of unmitigated geopolitical excess (e.g. the invasion of Iraq, Guantánamo Bay, use of torture, and so forth). This is unfortunate. Precluding any critical evaluation of the contemporary forms of violence that take place within the remit of humanitarian discourses and practices, there is a categorical failure to address how necessary violence continues to be an essential feature of the liberal encounter. Hence, with post-interventionary forms of violence no longer appearing to be any cause for concern, the nature of the racial imperative that underwrites the violence of contemporary liberal occupations is removed from the analytical arena.

# 1NC Speech

**Governmentality decimates ethics becoming due to its disciplinary tendencies**

**Clifford 2001** Michael Clifford is a professor of philosophy at the Mississippi State University. He holds a Ph.D. in Philosophy from Vanderbilt University. "Political Genealogy After Foucault." Routledge Publications, 2001. pg. 67-69

We have, first of all, a "heautocratic structure of the subject" defined by the same role polarities of masculine/feminine, active/passive, ruler/ruled. This, as well, turned on the question of "right use," which was adjusted according to one's status; the standards of appropriate conduct, whether in the domain of sexuality or politics, appealed to a public distinction in which the virtue of moderation was especially expected of "those who had rank, status, and responsibility in the city" (UP, 61). In fact, as Foucault demonstrates by citing such works as the Memorabilia and the Republic, one of the most important principles of government was to develop a "moderate state" in which the passions and desires of the many were controlled and governed by a few exemplary individuals who gained control over themselves. Thus, the ethical work one performed on oneself was designed to acquire not only a self-mastery, but a mastery over others. Says Foucault, "the development of personal virtues, of enkrateia in particular, was not essentially different from the development that enabled one to rise above other citizens to a position of leadership" (UP, 75). There was, in fact, a continuity and an isomorphism among governing oneself, governing one's household, and governing a city-they were "three practices of the same type." And, finally, the telos of the individual is coextensive with that of the state: their fates are intertwined. The freedom afforded to the individual through the cultivation of self-mastery is "indispensable" to the welfare of the state. Foucault quotes, from the Politics, "A State is good in virtue of the goodness of the citizens who have a share in the government. In our state all the citizens have a share in the government. We have therefore to consider how a man can become a good man. True, it is possible for all to be good collectively, without each being good individually. But the better thing is that each individual citizen should be good. The goodness of all is necessarily involved in the goodness of each." 19 In a broad sense, the individual's freedom, his mastery of his own passion and desires, was essential to the "well being and good order of the city" (UP, 79). In a more narrow sense, however, this freedom was reserved to a mode of political subjectivity that was heautocratic and privileged in character. That is, "in its full, positive form," this freedom referred to "a power that one brought on oneself in the power one exercised over others" (UP, 80). The virtue of moderation qualified an individual to exercise authority over others, which was a very important dimension of the individual's freedom. Those who did not govern, in fact, "received their principle of moderation" from those who did; thus, the "nonruler" had less freedom simply by virtue of his subordinate position. All of these concerns are expressed in the "two exemplary moral figures" on which political subjectivity in this period is modeled: (1) negatively by the vicious tyrant, and (2) "the positive image of the leader who was capable of exercising a strict control over himself in the authority he exercised over others" (UP, 81). Later, in the Greco-Roman period to the second or third century A.D., the connection between one's political subjectivity and one's sexual subjectivity will be far less isomorphic and much more problematic. In fact, the collapse of the Greek city-state precipitated a "crisis of the subject" in which the self and its relations to others in the social and political sphere were put into question as never before. This crisis was characterized by a "problematization of political activity" that paralleled the political transformations of this period.20 The more complex political structure of the state brought about a "relativization" in the exercise of power. For the individual, this manifested itself in a Stoical detachment from one's status as a political actor, reflecting a growing awareness of the factors that were beyond the individual's control. At the same time, the ruler/ruled dichotomy of earlier reflections was replaced with a recognition of the individual's "intermediary" function in the exercise of power. Instead of the classical Aristotelian alternation, one is both ruler and ruled at the same time: "Anyone who exercises power has to place himself in a field of complex relations where he occupies a transition point" (CS, 88). Where the individual found himself in this complex network of relations was a matter of birth or the artificial status projected onto him by society-neither of which he had any control over. But he could control the quality of the power and governance which he exercised from this position-and it was his moral duty to exercise this power the best way he could. And just as for the earlier Greeks, here also "the rationality of the government of others is the same as the rationality of the government of oneself" (CS, p. 89). That is, the object was to control the passions, to cultivate the virtues of discipline and moderation, to develop a self-mastery that would qualify one to govern others. Yet there were two important changes in the relation between self-government and government of others. First, it became less heautocratic, since one had to attend to multiple "levels" in the exercise of power. Second, self-mastery became a much more intense relation to self. This involved a separation, on the one hand, of virtue and the actual ethical work (regimen, ascetic practices) necessary to achieve virtue. On the other hand, while it was recognized that "a whole elaboration of the self by oneself was necessary" for the tasks of governing others, the exercise of power was based on the relationship the individual established (often through an arduous effort and attention to oneself) with himself, which tended to undermine the identification of oneself in terms of one's socially defined political status. Explains Foucault, "From the viewpoint of the relation to the self, the social and political identifications do not function as authentic marks of a mode of being; they are extrinsic, artificial, and unfounded signs" (CS, 93). Rather, the true measure of one's integrity, and the true register of one's subjectivity was, for whatever position or status one held, the quality of character the individual constructed for himself through the "cultivation of the self."

# 1NC Speech

**That project of liberal subject building is a nihilistic violent enterprise that destroys value to life and causes endless warfare**

**Evans and Reid 13** [Brad, Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Bristole, and Julian, “Dangerously exposed: the life and death of the resilient subject,” *Resilience*, 2013, Vol. 1 (2), pp. 83-98]

Resilient subjects are subjects that have accepted the imperative not to resist or secure themselves from the difficulties they are faced with but instead adapt to their enabling conditions. This renders them fully compliant to the logics of complexity with its concomitant adaptive and emergent qualities. Resistance here is transformed from being a political capacity aimed at the achievement of freedom from that which threatens and endangers to a purely reactionary impulse aimed at increasing the capacities of the subject to adapt to its dangers and simply reduce the degree to which it suffers. This conflation of resistance with resilience is not incidental but indicative of the nihilism of the underlying ontology of vulnerability at work in contemporary policies concerned with climate change and other supposedly catastrophic processes. What is nihilism, after all, if it is not a will to nothingness drawn from a willing reactive enslavement to forces deemed to be beyond our control as one merely lives out the catastrophic moment? It also alerts us to the fundamentally liberal nature of such policies and framings of the phenomenon of climate change defined, as liberalism has been since its origins, by a fundamental mistrust in the abilities of the human subject to secure itself in the world.10 Liberalism, as we have both explored extensively elsewhere, is a security project.11 From its outset, it has been concerned with seeking answers to the problem of how to secure itself as a regime of governance through the provision of security to the life of populations subject to it.12 It will, however, always be an incomplete project because its biopolitical foundations are flawed; life is not securable. It is a multiplicity of antagonisms and for some life to be made to live, some other life has to be made to die.13 That is a fundamental law of life which is biologically understood. This is the deep paradox that undercuts the entire liberal project while inciting it to govern ever more and ever better, becoming more inclusive and more assiduous at the provision of security to life, while learning how better to take life and make die that which falls outside and threatens the boundaries of its territories. Liberal regimes, in essence and from the outset, thrive on the insecurities of life which their capacity to provide security to provides the source of their legitimacy, becoming ever more adept at the taking of life which the provision of security to life requires.14 It is no accident that the most advanced liberal democracy in the world today, the United States of America, is also the most heavily armed state in the world. And not just the most heavily armed state today, but also the most heavily armed in human history. Liberal regimes do not and cannot accept the realities of this paradox. Which is why, far from being exhausted, the liberal project remains and has to be, in order for it to be true to its mission, distinctly transformative. Not only of the world in general and hence its endless resorts to war and violence to weed out those unruly lives that are the source of insecurity to the life that is the font of its security, but also, and yet more fundamentally, of the human subject itself; for this is a paradox which plays out, not just territorially, socially or between individuals, but within the diffuse and ultimately unknowable domain of human subjectivity itself. The liberal subject is divided and has to be in order to fulfil its mission, critically astute at discerning the distinctions within its own life between that which accords with the demands made of it in order to accord with liberal ways of living and those which do not comply with its biopolitical ambitions.15 Being divided means the liberal subject will always be incomplete, needing work, critical, insecure and mistrustful of itself for the purpose of its own self-improvement. The liberal subject is a project; one that renders life itself a project, subject to an endless task of critique and self-becoming, from cradle to grave. Sadly, many still find the concept of life appealing and even utopian. We are taught to think that we ought to choose unruly lives that are the source of insecurity to the life that is the font of its security, but also, and yet more fundamentally, of the human subject itself; for this is a paradox which plays out, not just territorially, socially or between individuals, but within the diffuse and ultimately unknowable domain of human subjectivity itself.

# 1NC Speech

**Their framing is part and parcel with a predatory corporate attack on academia --- voting for the hope that movements can be successful advances a social register capable of tapping into mass dissatisfaction and organizing dissent**

**Giroux 15** [Henry A., Global TV Network Chair Professor at McMaster University in the English and Cultural Studies Department and a Distinguished Visiting Professor at Ryerson University, “AUSTERITY AND THE POISON OF NEOLIBERAL MISEDUCATION,” Symploke22.1/2 (2015): 9-21, 441]

Most importantly, higher education too often informs a deadening dystopian vision of corporate America and old style authoritarian regimes that impose pedagogies of repression and disciplined conformity associated with societies that have lost any sense of ethical responsibility and respect for equality, public values, and justice. The democratic imagination has been transformed into a data machine that marshals its inhabitants into the neoliberal dream world of babbling consumers and armies of exploitative labor whose ultimate goal is to accumulate capital and initiate faculty and students into the brave new surveillance/punishing state that merges Orwell's Big Brother with Huxley's mind- altering soma.37 One consequence of this ongoing disinvestment in higher education is the expansion of a punishing state that increasingly criminalizes a range of social behaviors, wages war on the poor instead of poverty, militarizes local police forces, harasses poor minority youth, and spends more on prisons than on higher education. The punishing state produces fear and sustains itself on moral panics. Dissent gives way to widespread insecurity, uncertainty, and an obsession with personal safety.38 Precarity has become an organizing principle of a social order so as to legitimate and expand the ranks of those considered disposable while destroying those public sites that give voice to the narratives of those marginalized by race, class, gender, sexuality, and ideology. Public places are now militarized and those spaces once designed for dialogue, critique, informed exchange and dissent are now occupied by the police and other security forces who have become the most visible register of the surveillance-security state.39 Political, moral, and social indifference is the result, in part, of a public that is increasingly constituted within an educational landscape that reduces thinking to a burden and celebrates civic illiteracy as foundational for negotiating a society in which moral disengagement and political corruption go hand in hand.40 The assault on the university is symptomatic of the deep educational, economic, and political crisis facing the United States. It is but one lens through which to recognize that the future of democracy depends on achieving the educational and ethical standards of the society we inhabit.41 This lapse of the US public into a political and moral coma is also induced, in part, by an ever expanding, mass-mediated celebrity culture that trades in hype and sensation. It is also accentuated by a governmental apparatus that sanctions modes of training that undermine any viable notion of critical schooling and public pedagogy. While there is much being written about how unfair the Left is to the Obama administration, what is often forgotten by these liberal critics is that Obama has aligned himself with educational practices and policies as instrumentalist and anti-intellectual as they are politically reactionary, and therein lies one viable reason for not supporting his initiatives and administration.42 What liberals refuse to entertain is that the Left is correct in attacking Obama for his cowardly retreat from a number of progressive issues and his dastardly undermining of civil liberties. In fact, they do not go far enough in their criticisms. Often even progressives miss that Obama's views on what type of formative educational culture that is necessary to create critically engaged and socially responsible citizens are utterly reactionary and provide no space for the nurturance of a radically democratic imagination. Hence, while liberals point to some of Obama's progressive policies - often in a New Age discourse that betrays their own supine moralism-they fail to acknowledge that Obama's educational policies do nothing to contest, and are in fact aligned with, his weak-willed compromises and authoritarian policies. In other words, Obama's educational commitments undermine the creation of a formative culture capable of questioning authoritarian ideas, modes of governance and reactionary policies. The question is not whether Obama's policies are slightly less repugnant than his right-wing detractors. On the contrary, it is about how educators and others should engage politics in a more robust and democratic way by imagining what it would mean to work collectively and with "slow impatience" for a new political order outside of the current moderate and extreme right-wing politics and the debased, uncritical educational apparatus that supports it.43 The transformation of higher education into an adjunct of corporate control conjures up the image of a sorcerer's apprentice, of an institution that has become delusional in its infatuation with neoliberal ideology, values, and modes of instrumental pedagogy. Universities now claim that they are providing a service and in doing so not only demean any substantive notion of governance, research, and teaching, but abstract education from any sense of civic responsibility. Neoliberal ideology and modes of governance represent a toxin that supplies a predatory class of zombies who produce dead zones of the imagination, spaces in which an audit culture triumphs over critical thinking, informed debate, decent working conditions, and a vision in which social bonds and civic responsibility are central to learning itself. Higher education reneged on enlightenment ideals and lost its sense of democratic mission but it also increasingly offers no defense to the "totalitarianism that haunts the modem ideal of political mancipation."44 Driven by an audit culture and increasingly oblivious to the demands of a democracy for an informed and critical citizenry, neoliberalism now devours its children, disregards its faculty, and resembles an institution governed by myopic accountants who should be ashamed of what they are proud of. The university needs to be reclaimed as a crucial public sphere where administrat- ors, faculty, and students can imagine what a free and substantive democracy might look like and what it means to make education relevant to such a crucial pedagogical and political task. Universities must press the claim for creating social bonds and public spheres in which democracy is viewed as a struggle over agency and new modes of communal relations that refuse to reduce social interaction to a form of social combat and Social Darwinism as the organizing principle of politics and everyday life. What must be upheld by educators and others interested in preserving the link between education and democracy is that "higher education [must] remain a public good - with all of us relying and depending on the system not just for the education of doctors, nurses, teachers, accountants and other professionals - but to provide the critical thinking that is the lifeblood of our democracy."45 Any viable notion of a radical democracy needs critical and engaged agents capable of developing the disposition and capacities to resist repressive attacks on thinking, feeling, and desiring so they can create the conditions for them to not only shape ideological, economic, and political forces that govern their everyday lives, but also so they can imagine alternative futures and horizons of possibility. Such horizons of possibility can be glimpsed despite all the forces aligned against it in those places all over the globe where young people refuse the dictates of authoritarians and the savagery of predatory capitalism and its politics of austerity. Austerity is the ideological and policy hammer that now drives neoliberalism assault on higher education. This is not merely an economic tool but also an ideological weapon used to depoliticize any viable sense of critical agency and the institutions that still function as a public good. Faculty, students, unions, workers, educators, intellectuals and others need to organize to create a world-wide movement for the defense of public good and high on its agenda should be the recognition that austerity policies are really about the consolidation of class power and should be understood as one of the foundational elements of the new authoritarianism. The stakes are high because the struggle is not simply against austerity measures but the institutions and economic order that produce them. One place to begin is with a new sense of politics driven by a notion of educated hope. Hope turns radical when it exposes the violence of neoliberalism - acts of state and corporate aggression against democracy, humanity, and ecological stability itself. But hope does more than critique, dismantle, and expose the ideologies, values, institutions, and social relations that are pushing so many countries today into authoritarianism, austerity, violence, and war. Hope can energize and mobilize groups, neighbourhoods, communities, campuses, and networks of people to articulate and advance insurgent discourses in the movement toward developing higher education as part of a broader insurrectional democracy. Hope is an important political and subjective register that can not only enable people to think beyond the neoliberal austerity machine - the chronic and intergenerational injustices deeply structured into all levels of society-but also to advance forms of egalitarian community that celebrate the voice, well-being, inherent dignity, and participation of each person as an integral thread in the ever-evolving fabric of living democracy.

# 2NC Racial Profiling

**The plan is a violent endorsement of broader surveillance networks poking at minor reforms only legitimizing this enterprise and cultivate widespread political apathy**

**Giroux 14** [Henry A., Global TV Network Chair Professor at McMaster University in the English and Cultural Studies Department and a Distinguished Visiting Professor at Ryerson University, “Totalitarian Paranoia in the Post-Orwellian Surveillance State,” Truthout, 10 February 2014, <http://www.truth-out.org/opinion/item/21656-totalitarian-paranoia-in-the-post-orwellian-surveillance-state>]

In his videotaped Christmas message, Snowden references Orwell's warning of "the dangers of microphones, video cameras and TVs that watch us,"2 allowing the state to regulate subjects within the most intimate spaces of private life. But these older modes of surveillance, Snowden elaborates, however, are nothing compared to what is used to infringe on our personal privacy today. For Snowden, the threat posed by the new surveillance state can be measured by its reach and use of technologies that far outdate anything Orwell envisioned and pose a much greater threat to the privacy rights of citizens and the reach of sovereign powers. He reiterates this point by reminding his viewers that "a child born today will grow up with no conception of privacy at all - they will never know what it means to have a private moment to themselves, an unrecorded, unanalyzed thought."3 Snowden is right about the danger to privacy rights but his analysis fails to go far enough in linking together the question of surveillance with the rise of "networked societies," global flows of power and the emergence of the totalitarian state.4

The democratic ideal rooted in the right to privacy under the modernist state in which Orwell lived out his political imagination has been transformed and mutilated, almost beyond recognition. Just as Orwell's fable has morphed over time into a combination of "realistic novel," real-life documentary and a form of reality TV, privacy has been altered radically in an age of permanent, 'nonstop' global exchange and circulation. So, too, and in the current period of historical amnesia, privacy has been redefined through the material and ideological registers of a neoliberal order in which the right to privacy has succumbed to the seductions of a narcissistic culture and casino capitalism's unending necessity to turn every relationship into an act of commerce and to make all aspects of daily life visible and subject to data manipulation.5 In a world devoid of care, compassion and protection, privacy is no longer connected and resuscitated through its connection to public life, the common good or a vulnerability born of the recognition of the frailty of human life. In a world in which the worst excesses of capitalism are unchecked, privacy is nurtured in a zone of historical amnesia, indifferent to its transformation and demise under a "broad set of panoptic practices."6 Consequently, culture loses its power as the bearer of public memory in a social order where a consumerist-driven ethic "makes impossible any shared recognition of common interests or goals" and furthers the collective indifference to the growth of the surveillance state.7

Surveillance has become a growing feature of daily life. In fact, it is more appropriate to analyze the culture of surveillance, rather than address exclusively the violations committed by the corporate-surveillance state. In this instance, the surveillance and security state is one that not only listens, watches and gathers massive amounts of information through data mining necessary for identifying consumer populations but also acculturates the public into accepting the intrusion of surveillance technologies and privatized commodified values into all aspects of their lives. Personal information is willingly given over to social media and other corporate-based websites and gathered daily as people move from one targeted web site to the next across multiple screens and digital apparatuses. As Ariel Dorfman points out, “social media users gladly give up their liberty and privacy, invariably for the most benevolent of platitudes and reasons,” all the while endlessly shopping online and texting.7A This collecting of information might be most evident in the video cameras that inhabit every public space from the streets, commercial establishments and workplaces to the schools our children attend as well as in the myriad scanners placed at the entry points of airports, stores, sporting events and the like.

Yet the most important transgression may not only be happening through the unwarranted watching, listening and collecting of information but also in a culture that normalizes surveillance by upping the pleasure quotient and enticements for consumers who use the new digital technologies and social networks to simulate false notions of community and to socialize young people into a culture of security and commodification in which their identities, values and desires are inextricably tied to a culture of private addictions, self-help and commodification.

Surveillance feeds on the related notions of fear and delusion. Authoritarianism in its contemporary manifestations, as evidenced so grippingly in Orwell's text, no longer depends on the raw displays of power but instead has become omniscient in a culture of control in which the most cherished notions of agency collapse into unabashed narcissistic exhibitions and confessions of the self, serving as willing fodder for the spying state. The self has become not simply the subject of surveillance but a willing participant and object. Operating off the assumption that some individuals will not willingly turn their private lives over to the spying state and corporations, the NSA and other intelligence agencies work hard to create a turnkey authoritarian state in which the "electronic self" becomes public property. Every space is now enclosed within the purview of an authoritarian society that attempts to govern the entirety of social life. As Jonathan Schell points out:

Thanks to Snowden, we also know that unknown volumes of like information are being extracted from Internet and computer companies, including Microsoft, Yahoo, Google, Facebook, PalTalk, AOL, Skype, YouTube and Apple. The first thing to note about these data is that a mere generation ago, they did not exist. They are a new power in our midst, flowing from new technology, waiting to be picked up; and power, as always, creates temptation, especially for the already powerful. Our cellphones track our whereabouts. Our communications pass through centralized servers and are saved and kept for a potential eternity in storage banks, from which they can be recovered and examined. Our purchases and contacts and illnesses and entertainments are tracked and agglomerated. If we are arrested, even our DNA can be taken and stored by the state. Today, alongside each one of us, there exists a second, electronic self, created in part by us, in part by others. This other self has become de facto public property, owned chiefly by immense data-crunching corporations, which use it for commercial purposes. Now government is reaching its hand into those corporations for its own purposes, creating a brand-new domain of the state-corporate complex.8

Social cynicism and societal indifference accelerate a broken culture in which reason has been replaced by consumer-fed hallucinatory hopes.9 Surveillance and its accompanying culture of fear now produce subjects that revel in being watched, turning the practice if not the threat posed by surveillance into just another condition for performing the self. Every human act and behavior is now potential fodder for YouTube, Facebook or some other social network. Privacy has become a curse, an impediment that subverts the endless public display of the self. Zygmunt Bauman echoes this sentiment in arguing that: These days, it is not so much the possibility of a betrayal or violation of privacy that frightens us, but the opposite: shutting down the exits. The area of privacy turns into a site of incarceration, the owner of private space being condemned and doomed to stew in his or her own juice; forced into a condition marked by an absence of avid listeners eager to wring out and tear away the secrets from behind the ramparts of privacy, to put them on public display and make them everybody's shared property and a property everybody wishes to share.10

# 2NC Racial Profiling

**The aff is a smokescreen for a massive buildup of public surveillance apparatuses --- otherwise they have no mechanism for enforcing profiling bans**

**Capers 13** [I. Bennett Capers, Professor of Law at Brooklyn College of Law, “Crime, surveillance, and communities,” *Fordham Urban Law Journal*, 40.3 (Mar. 2013): p959]

Now consider the work camera surveillance can do to address these issues. First, take the racial profiling of minority drivers. Cameras already monitor automated bridge and tunnel tolling systems, (145) and photo-radars already catch red-light violations. (146) But this is only the start. As Elizabeth Joh has explored, technology already exists to police almost all traffic violations. (147) Dedicated short-range communications technology (DSRC) means that cars are increasingly being equipped to communicate pertinent data to other devices, including data regarding the car's location and speed, and warnings regarding the car's mechanics or registration. (148) While DSRC is already being used to reduce collisions--by alerting a driver that another car is approaching, for example--this same technology can be used to generate automatic traffic tickets. (149) Clearly, such automated surveillance has the potential to free police to focus on actual policing. But more importantly, it has the advantage of being racially neutral. (150) Rather than using pretext stops to single out minority motorists, surveillance technology will "ticket" without regard to race. I have argued in other work that facial profiling does more than simply impose a "racial tax," as Randall Kennedy suggests. (151) In fact, racial profiling, as a marker of inequality, is citizenship-diminishing. (152) Cameras, by contrast, neither discriminate nor engage in arbitrary policing. (153) They treat all traffic offenders alike and therefore are citizenship-enhancing.

# 2NC Racial Profiling

**“Cultural” profiling fills in as a euphemism for race – racial biases continue absent the alt’s galvanization of mass change**

**Wade 15** [Peter, Professor of Anthropology at the University of Manchester, “Racism and liberalism: the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion,” *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Volume 38, Issue 8, 2015]

In the literature on racism, the broad change, since the Second World War, towards the erasure of explicit discourses about racial difference has been widely noted. The story is that with the crumbling of a scientific consensus about the biological basis of racial difference and inequality, and with a global reaction against the Nazi racism that changed the image of eugenics from that of a progressive and rational movement for social change to that of an odious instrument of biopolitical aggression, it became increasingly difficult to explicitly use a discourse about race in the public sphere. In fact, some countries continue to use an explicit discourse of race – for example, Britain's Race Relations Act, or the census and other official enumeration categories of race in the USA and Brazil – but these are deployed in the interests of the post-war hegemonic ideology, that is, anti-racism. The rationale is that, in order to combat racial inequality, it is necessary to measure it and thus to count by racial category. Sometimes in this process, the word ethnicity is used instead of race, thus blurring the explicit presence of a racial discourse, while clearly referring to categories previously named as racial.¶ Meanwhile, it is widely argued that racial thinking and racist ideologies and practices continue, despite the widespread public denial of race as an acceptable mode of discourse (Goldberg 2008; Lentin and Titley 2011). This argument often refers to cultural racism – in which reference to biological differences are submerged or replaced by reference to cultural attributes, which serve to differentiate categories of people that look very similar to the categories of older, more explicitly racial discourses; culture may also be essentialized and naturalized (even biologized) in ways that also blur the difference between cultural and biological modes of reference. A key feature here, noted by various commentators (Stolcke 1995; Miles and Brown 2003), is a discourse about how people naturally prefer to ‘be with their own kind’. The notion of ‘kind’ in this discourse is superficially and convincingly defined in terms of culture – people feeling comfortable with others who share their language, practices, values, beliefs, and so on. However, (1) such a proclivity is said to be a natural human tendency (hardwired in by evolution in sociobiological versions of the argument), thus bringing biology into the equation; and (2) if people do want to ‘stick with their own’, then they will also want to breed with them, which tends to make biology and culture overlap: kinship is a key domain in which ideas about biocultural difference are reproduced (Wade 2002).¶ Arguments adducing the persistence of racism locate it at different levels. It may be identified in the practices of the state, for example in racial profiling practices – secret and explicitly racial, or open and euphemized as ‘cultural’ – aimed at monitoring ‘security’; or in the idea that British immigration policy after 1950 actively sought to restrict the entry of New Commonwealth (i.e. non-white) immigrants, without mentioning race. Racism may also be identified in the everyday practices of ordinary citizens, most obviously those of a far-right persuasion, but also many who are just ‘doing the best for their families’, when they avoid certain schools and areas, or when they just prefer to ‘stick to their own’. These two levels can come together in the identification of ‘institutional racism’, when the everyday prejudices of state agents (e.g. police ‘canteen culture’) drive practices such as racial profiling, independently of official policy.¶ What we are faced with here is a sea change towards anti-racism and the silencing of race, alongside the persistence of differentiations and discriminations of a racial character (Winant 2004). This deep-seated tension is not unusual. It is a reflection of the tension in liberalism between ideals of equality and, not just the simple existence of inequality, but the way people also actively maintain that inequality, defending what they have or want to have against others seen as competitors, as less deserving, or as a threat. Practices of inclusion always coexist with practices of exclusion in changing ways and with a shifting balance between them: the task of the historian and the social scientist is to identify how these practices operate and interweave.

# Link – Single-issue approach

**Single-issue surveillance approaches fail and diminish the desire for radical change required for mass resistance – radical restructuring is key**

**Giroux 14** [Henry A., Global TV Network Chair Professor at McMaster University in the English and Cultural Studies Department and a Distinguished Visiting Professor at Ryerson University, “Totalitarian Paranoia in the Post-Orwellian Surveillance State,” Truthout, 10 February 2014, <http://www.truth-out.org/opinion/item/21656-totalitarian-paranoia-in-the-post-orwellian-surveillance-state>]

If the first task of resistance is to make dominant power clear by addressing critically and meaningfully the abuses perpetrated by the corporate surveillance state and how such transgressions affect the daily lives of people in different ways, the second step is to move from understanding and critique to the hard work of building popular movements that integrate rather than get stuck and fixated in single-issue politics. The left has been fragmented for too long, and the time has come to build national and international movements capable of dismantling the political, economic and cultural architecture put in place by the new authoritarianism and its post-Orwellian surveillance industries. This is not a call to reject identity and special-issue politics as much as it is a call to build broad-based alliances and movements, especially among workers, labor unions, educators, youth groups, artists, intellectuals, students, the unemployed and others relegated, marginalized and harassed by the political and financial elite. At best, such groups should form a vigorous and broad-based third party for the defense of public goods and the establishment of a radical democracy. This is not a call for a party based on traditional hierarchical structures but a party consisting of a set of alliances among different groups that would democratically decide its tactics and strategies.

Modern history is replete with such struggles, and the arch of that history has to be carried forward before it is too late. In a time of tyranny, thoughtful and organized resistance is not a choice; it is a necessity. In the struggle to dismantle the authoritarian state, reform is only partially acceptable. Surely, as Fred Branfman argues, rolling back the surveillance state can take the form of fighting: to end bulk collection of information; demand Congressional oversight; indict executive-branch officials when they commit perjury; give Congress the capacity to genuinely oversee executive agency; provide strong whistle-blower protection; and restructure the present system of classification.84 These are important reforms worth fighting for, but they do not go far enough. What is needed is a radical restructuring of our understanding of democracy and what it means to bring it into being. The words of Zygmunt Bauman are useful in understanding what is at stake in such a struggle. He writes: "Democracy expresses itself in continuous and relentless critique of institutions; democracy is an anarchic, disruptive element inside the political system; essential, as a force of dissent and change. One can best recognize a democratic society by its constant complaints that it is not democratic enough."85 What cannot be emphasized enough is that only through collective struggles can change take place against modern-day authoritarianism. If the first order of authoritarianism is unchecked secrecy, the first moment of resistance to such an order is widespread critical awareness of state and corporate power and its threat to democracy, coupled with a desire for radical change rather than reformist corrections. Democracy involves a sharing of political existence, an embrace of the commons and the demand for a future that cannot arrive quickly enough. In short, politics needs a jump start, because democracy is much too important to be left to the whims, secrecy and power of those who have turned the principles of self-government against themselves.

# Link – Prism Turns Aff\*\*

**Corporate data surveillance and government collusion fills in for PRISM -- that turns the aff and widens the panoptic gaze of the surveillance state cloud computing advantage magnifies this link**

**Sullivan 13** [John L., Associate Professor of Media and Communication at Muhlenberg College in Allentown, PA, “Uncovering the data panopticon: The urgent need for critical scholarship in an era of corporate and government surveillance,” *Political Economy of Communication* Vol 1, No 2 (2013), http://polecom.org/index.php/polecom/article/view/23/192]

Big data and the panoptic sort In Philip K. Dick’s 1956 science fiction short story, The Minority Report, crime in a futuristic United States has been all but extinguished because the police have discovered the ability to predict future events. In this peaceful dystopia, suspects are arrested and charged before their crimes are even committed. While real-world law enforcement agencies cannot (yet) predict future events, the recent revelations about the scope and nature of the National Security Agency’s (NSA) domestic digital spying program suggest they have developed some formidable tools to locate would-be terrorists. Privacy advocates were outraged by whistleblower Edward Snowden’s revelation that the NSA, in cooperation with technology companies, routinely stored, processed and analyzed millions of private emails, video chats, online phone calls, and internet file transfers under the auspices of a program called PRISM. Recent news reports based upon Snowden’s documents have revealed that even encrypted emails, documents, and online banking transactions are being regularly accessed by the NSA (Larson and Shane, 2013). While these revelations about domestic digital wiretapping without court orders have caused a stir in the American and global press, the privacy dangers associated with this type of data surveillance are not new to the scholarly community. Exactly 20 years ago, communication scholar Oscar H Gandy Jr (1993) meticulously outlined the growing threat to individual privacy posed by the cooperation between corporate and government data gathering in a book called The Panoptic Sort. At a time when the internet was in its infancy, when desktop computer processing was a fraction of what it is today, and five years before the founding of Google, Gandy warned that organizations like Equifax, TRW, and the Direct Marketing Association (DMA) were amassing huge repositories of consumer data that were gathered passively whenever individuals made purchases via credit cards. When these data are combined with sophisticated matching algorithms and sorted against huge government databases like the census, he argued, they enabled precise tracking of individuals’ behaviors, political views, and other sensitive private information. The precision of such discrimination transforms the routine sorting of personal data into a powerful form of institutional power. Building upon Foucault’s (1995) seminal analysis of disciplinary systems in society, Gandy argued that the scale of the data collection and analysis performed by government and corporate institutions created a panopticon wherein citizen actions would eventually become circumscribed within an ever-widening net of personal data surveillance. The end result, he observed, is “an antidemocratic system of control that cannot be transformed because it can serve no purpose other than that for which it was designed—the rationalization and control of human existence”(Gandy, 1993: 227). We’ve come a long way since 1993. Who could have imagined services like Facebook, Twitter, and Tumblr that not only encourage, but actively incentivize the voluntary dissemination of personal information online? Over the past 20 years, the centrality of the internet to the global communications infrastructure has made it a target for the type of panoptic sorting that Gandy described. Now that the world knows about PRISM, it is tempting to imagine that enhanced public scrutiny will effectively limit these programs. I don’t think that is likely. In fact, there are four specific trends that foretell a greater expansion of the data panopticon: convergence and the central place of software in social, commercial and political systems; the growing importance of metadata for routing, storage and sorting of information; the global business of data storage and retrieval; the blurring of lines between corporate and government data mining. The convergence of digital technologies and the importance of software In the previous era of analog technologies, such as wired telephones and reel-to-reel tapes, each specific technology had a limited range of capabilities alongside a specific set of legal standards to accompany their use. The Wiretap Act of 1968, for example, prohibits law enforcement from wiretapping telephones without a court order because doing so would violate the 4th Amendment protections of both the suspect and anyone that communicates with them. Today, there are few discrete technologies anymore. Thanks to technological convergence, almost all forms of communication today utilize some form of digital communication, and many do this via the Internet. Software has now replaced specific forms of communication hardware as the nexus for new types of digital communication, from Skype and FaceTime to emails and tweets. Creating legal precedents for protecting individual privacy throughout this myriad of new options has been difficult. Indeed, new options are emerging all the time, and software is extremely fungible in functionality as it adapts quickly to new situations and uses. We lack a coherent legal regime to counteract the interception of these communications. For example, Skype phone calls can be protected under the existing federal wiretap laws, but emails and text messages cannot. The rise of metadata The expansion of online communications has generated an explosion of metadata. Metadata are the transaction records that are generated whenever you send an email or text message. It identifies the location from which the message was sent, when it was sent, the subject of the message, the recipient(s) of the message, the web address of the recipient(s), and more. The Obama Administration has argued that its domestic intelligence program complied with the law because it simply scanned the metadata of email transactions to search for anomalies rather than accessing the content of those emails. As a recent article in The Economist (2013) pointed out, however, while the usefulness of metadata in an analog era was limited (hence the lower evidentiary standards required in courts to obtain that information), today, thanks to the internet, “metadata can now provide a detailed portrait of who people know, where they go, and their daily routines.” (para. 8) Therefore, the argument that random metadata searches do not violate users’ privacy becomes difficult to sustain. The business of data storage and retrieval The cost of storing digital data has fallen dramatically in the past 20 years, making the retention of vast quantities of individual data routine and cheap. This incentivizes the retention of digital information in ‘the cloud’ for longer periods of time. This creates a valuable resource for commercial data miners and law enforcement officials alike. As Wired Magazine (Copeland, 2013) outlined in its 20th anniversary edition, in 1993 a gigabyte of computer hard drive space cost almost $1,900.00; today the same amount of digital storage space is worth four cents. This dramatic drop in the cost of storage naturally encourages the retention of digital information by companies and the government. This raises important privacy concerns. Mobile telephone providers, such as Verizon, AT&T, and T-Mobile, regularly store customer metadata (the records of all their telephone communications, including location information) for 18–24 months depending on the carrier. Companies like Google and Dropbox offer generous amounts of online data storage (‘cloud computing’) to users in exchange for the ability to target those consumers with advertising and marketing messages. Companies like Facebook and Twitter profit handsomely by mining their massive storehouses of user data for the purposes of target marketing to specific users. The blurred line between corporate and government data mining Lastly, the Snowden leaks have revealed that the wall between corporate and government data mining is paper thin. Since the revelations about the NSA became public, technology companies like Apple and Google have publicized the fact that they have received thousands of NSA requests for individual user data over the past 12 months. While some companies have resisted handing over user data without a specific warrant from the government, other technology companies have complied without challenge, worried about the implication of refusing the federal government. Additionally, as a headline article in The New York Times (Sengupta, 2013)outlined, the NSA and FBI have, increasingly, routinely analyzed huge databases of online communications. They have signed lucrative contracts with Silicon Valley technology companies to perform these analyses. The New York Times also uncovered the existence of a revolving door between technology companies and the government. For example, former Facebook Chief Security Officer Max Kelly was hired by the NSA in 2010 (Risen and Wingfield, 2013). Such arrangements create a clear conflict of interest for the companies to whom we have entrusted our data. For the first time, these companies may have both a legal and financial interest in handing over sensitive personal information to government agencies. Of all of the recent revelations about the mining of individual data, this one is perhaps the most troubling. What’s the harm? Given these threats to individual privacy online, what’s the harm if programs like PRISM have been effective in thwarting potential terrorist attacks? Snowden answered this question himself in his infamous interview with The Guardian newspaper (Greenwald, 2013) by saying: Because even if you’re not doing anything wrong you’re being watched and recorded. And the storage capability of these systems increases every year consistently by orders of magnitude to where it’s getting to the point where you don’t have to have done anything wrong. You simply have to eventually fall under suspicion from somebody even by a wrong call. (7:14–7:33) Snowden is alluding here to the problem of ‘collateral damage’ arising from the search of online personal data. Innocent citizens may be caught up in data searches that are meant to locate illegal activities. This problem was most recently demonstrated in 2012 when a warrant to search the email account of Paula Broadwell for a harassment charge unwittingly uncovered an extramarital affair between her and David Petraeus, the then CIA Director and former General. These targeted searches also reverse the burden of proof. Once someone is targeted for government scrutiny because of an email they may have sent, it becomes difficult for them to clear their name. Additionally, we may have started down a path that will be difficult to alter. Once companies and governments begin collecting and storing citizens’ private data, those institutions will continue to imagine new uses for such data, if only to justify the expense of gathering and storing it. History and human nature tell us that the storage and sorting of online personal data will increasingly become the solution to problems we haven’t even yet encountered, alongside existing problems (tracking terrorists, criminals, tax evaders, copyright violators, etc.) The public and the role of critical scholarship Given that we still live in a liberal democracy, what is the public’s role in this process? Shouldn’t citizens help to shape a proper balance between privacy and security? In The Panoptic Sort, Gandy traced the social origins of privacy and considered the available cognitive strategies for a public trying to grapple with this amorphous concept within a changing techno-cultural environment. In focus group interviews, Gandy explored the types of information consumers had about the technologies that could be used to observe and profile them. Respondents were asked whether they thought these practices were legitimate, and whether they had reflected upon the sharing of private information among interested parties (including sharing between private corporations and government agencies). These 1992 focus group participants were quite sophisticated in their responses, observing that the gathering of personal information may be justified or even beneficial in some cases, but that no information “should ever be used to restrict or limit one’s pursuits, happiness, or joy of life” (Gandy, 1993: 135). Gandy also cited nationwide polling conducted in 1990 by Equifax, which found that 46 percent of respondents were “very concerned” about “threats to... their personal privacy” (Gandy, 1993: 140). Today, in a post-September 11 society, the surreptitious gathering of personal information has reached new heights, yet public opinion on the appropriate boundaries of private information retrieval has shifted markedly. A recent poll conducted by the Pew Research Center, for example, found that 56 percent of Americans approve of the NSA’s tracking of phone records as an acceptable method of combatting terrorism (Pew Research Center, 2013). In that same poll, respondents were almost equally divided about the NSA’s policy of scanning all emails to prevent terrorism; 52 percent disapproved while 45 percent approved. We see a somewhat disturbing trend here. While the tools available to gather, store and process personal information have dramatically expanded in the past 20 years, the public’s privacy concerns seem to have abated, albeit only slightly. Increased terrorism fears are no doubt one of the prime catalysts for this, but we should not discount the prospect that popularization of email, search engines like Google and social media have lessened our inhibitions regarding the sharing and monitoring of personal information. As Mark Andrejevic (2005, 2007, 2009) has noted in his impressive corpus of research, citizens are not only being continually monitored by corporations and law enforcement, they are essentially monitoring each other. This is what he calls ‘lateral surveillance’. At a time when we are encouraged to continually monitor our friends, relatives, neighbors and acquaintances via social networking, the legitimate boundaries surrounding our private information have been blurred. As Snowden’s startling NSA revelations demonstrate, shifts in the nature of digital privacy require a vigorous response from critical scholars. Following Gandy’s 1993 book, there needs to be more research on the political economy of personal data gathering, storage and analysis. Rather than accept these new technological systems as a starting point for analysis, we should question the philosophical and institutional foundations of the modern surveillance state. As Gandy noted in his conclusion, we should not jump on the metaphorical train to the future without first addressing its path and destination. He wrote: It is the work of critical scholarship to raise doubts in the minds of the other passengers, to give voice to their unspoken concerns about the competence of the engineers, to validate their mistrust of the digitized voices that announce the next station or the final destination. It is the work of critical scholarship to speak to the engineers, to wonder aloud with them about whether the tracks will carry a train this long, this fast, that far. (Gandy, 1993: 230)

# Link – Prism Turns Aff\*\*

**The aff is structurally incapable of solving trust – its only result is to prop up the surveillance state**

**Giroux 14**

Henry A., Global TV Network Chair Professor at McMaster University in the English and Cultural Studies Department and a Distinguished Visiting Professor at Ryerson University, “Totalitarian Paranoia in the Post-Orwellian Surveillance State,” Truthout, 10 February 2014, <http://www.truth-out.org/opinion/item/21656-totalitarian-paranoia-in-the-post-orwellian-surveillance-state>

The corporate-surveillance state collects troves of data, but the groups often targeted by traditional and new forms of digital surveillance are more often than not those who fall within the parameters of either being a threat to authority, reject the consumer culture or are simply considered disposable under the regime of neoliberal capitalism. The political, class and racial nature of suppression has a long history in the United States and cannot be ignored by whitewashing the issue of surveillance as a form of state violence by making an appeal to the necessity of safety and security.

Totalitarian paranoia runs deep in American society, and it now inhabits the highest levels of government.61 There is no excuse for intellectuals or any other member of the American public to address the existence, meaning and purpose of the surveillance-security state without placing it in the historical structure of the times. Or what might be called a historical conjuncture in which the legacy of totalitarianism is once again reasserting itself in new forms. Historical memory is about more than recovering the past; it is also about imputing history with a sense of responsibility, treating it with respect rather than with reverence. Historical memory should always be insurgent, rubbing "taken-for-granted history against the grain so as to revitalize and rearticulate what one sees as desirable and necessary for an open, just and life sustaining" democracy and future.62 Historical memory is a crucial battleground for challenging a corporate-surveillance state that is motivated by the anti-democratic legal, economic and political interests. But if memory is to function as a witness to injustice and the practice of criticism and renewal, it must embrace the pedagogical task of connecting the historical, personal and social. It is worth repeating that C.W. Mills was right in arguing that those without power need to connect personal troubles with public issues and that is as much an educational endeavour and responsibility as it is a political and cultural task.63

Obama's recent speech on reforms to the NSA serves as a text that demands not just close reading but also becomes a model illustrating how history can be manipulated to legitimate the worst violations of privacy and civil rights, if not state- and corporate-based forms of violence.64 For Obama, the image of Paul Revere or the Sons of Liberty is referenced to highlight the noble ideals of surveillance in the interest of freedom and mostly provide a historical rationale for the emergence of the massive spying behemoths such as the NSA that now threaten the fabric of US democracy and massive data on everyone, not just terrorists. Of course, what Obama leaves out is that Paul Revere and his accomplices acted "to curtail government power as the main threat to freedom."65 Obama provides a sanitized reference to history in order to bleach the surveillance state of its criminal past and convince the American public that, as Michael Ratner states, "Orwellian surveillance is somehow patriotic."66 Obama's surveillance state does just the opposite, and the politicians such as Rep. Mike Ford and Feinstein are more than willing to label legitimate whistle-blowers - including, most famously, Snowden, Manning and Hammond - as traitors while keeping silent when high-ranking government officials, particularly James Clapper Jr., the director of national security, lied before a Senate Intelligence Committee.

Obama's appeal to the American people to trust those in the highest positions of government and corporate dominance regarding the use of the mammoth power of the surveillance state makes a mockery out of the legitimate uses of such power, any vestige of critical thought and historical memory. The United States has been lying to its people for more than 50 years, and such lies extend from falsifying the reasons for going to war with Vietnam and Iraq to selling arms to Iran in order to fund the reactionary Nicaraguan Contras. Why should anyone trust a government that has condoned torture, spied on at least 35 world leaders,67 supports indefinite detention, places bugs in thousands of computers all over the world, kills innocent people with drone attacks, promotes the post office to log mail for law enforcement agencies and arbitrarily authorizes targeted assassinations?68 Or, for that matter, a president that instituted the Insider Threat Program, which was designed to get government employees to spy on each other and "turn themselves and others in for failing to report breaches,"69 which includes "any unauthorized disclosure of anything, not just classified materials."70

# Link\* – Surveillance Reform

**Focusing on government surveillance without tackling corporate data collection locks in place corporate domination and authoritarianism**

**Giroux 14** [Henry A., Global TV Network Chair Professor at McMaster University in the English and Cultural Studies Department and a Distinguished Visiting Professor at Ryerson University, “Totalitarian Paranoia in the Post-Orwellian Surveillance State,” Truthout, 10 February 2014, <http://www.truth-out.org/opinion/item/21656-totalitarian-paranoia-in-the-post-orwellian-surveillance-state>]

The surveillance state with its immense data mining capabilities represents a historical rupture from traditional notions of modernity with its emphasis on enlightenment, reason, and the social contract. The older modernity held up the ideals of justice, equality, freedom, and democracy, however flawed. The investment in public goods was seen as central to a social contract that implied that all citizens should have access to those provisions, resources, institutions, and benefits that expanded their sense of agency and social responsibility. The new modernity and its expanding surveillance net subordinates human needs, public goods, and justice to the demands of commerce and the accumulation of capital, at all costs. The contemporary citizen is primarily a consumer and entrepreneur wedded to the belief that the most desirable features of human behavior are rooted in a "basic tendency towards competitive, acquisitive and uniquely self-interested behavior which is the central fact of human social life."23 Modernity is now driven by the imperatives of a savage neoliberal political and economic system that embrace what Charles Derber and June Sekera call a "public goods deficit" in which "budgetary priorities" are relentlessly pushed so as to hollow out the welfare state and drastically reduce social provisions as part of a larger neoliberal counter revolution to lower the taxes of the rich and mega-corporations while selling off public good to private interests.24 Debates about the meaning and purpose of the public and social good have been co-opted by a politics of fear, relegating notions of the civic good, public sphere, and even the very word "public" to the status of a liability, if not a pathology.25 Fear has lost its social connotations and no longer references fear of social deprivations such as poverty, homelessness, lack of health care, and other fundamental conditions of agency. Fear is now personalized, reduced to an atomized fear that revolves around crime, safety, apocalypse, and survival. In this instance, as the late Harvard economist John Kenneth Galbraith once warned, modernity now privileges "a disgraceful combination of 'private opulence and public squalor.' "26 This is not surprising given the basic elements of neoliberal policy, which as Jeremy Gilbert indicates, include the: privatization of public assets, contraction and centralization of democratic institutions, deregulation of labor markets, reductions in progressive taxation, restrictions on labor organization, labor market deregulation, active encouragement of competitive and entrepreneurial modes of relation across the public and commercial sectors.27

Under the regime of neoliberal capitalism, the expansion of government and corporate surveillance measures become synonymous with new forms of governance and an intensification of material and symbolic violence.28 Rather than wage a war on terrorists, the neoliberal security state wages a war on dissent in the interest of consolidating class power. How else to explain the merging of corporate and state surveillance systems updated with the most sophisticated shared technologies used in the last few years to engage in illicit counterintelligence operations, participate in industrial espionage29 and disrupt and attack pro-democracy movements such as Occupy and a range of other nonviolent social movements protesting a myriad of state and corporate injustices.30 This type of illegal spying in the interest of stealing industrial secrets and closing down dissent by peaceful protesters has less to do with national security than it has to do with mimicking the abuses and tactics used by the Stasi in East Germany during the Cold War. How else to explain why many law-abiding citizens "and those with dissenting views within the law can be singled out for surveillance and placed on wide-ranging watch lists relating to terrorism."31

Public outrage seems to disappear, with few exceptions, as the state and its corporate allies do little to protect privacy rights, civil liberties and a culture of critical exchange and dissent. Even worse, they shut down a culture of questioning and engage in forms of domestic terrorism. State violence in this case becomes the preferred antidote to the demanding work of reflection, analysis, dialogue and imagining the points of views of others. The war against dissent waged by secret counterintelligence agencies is a mode of domestic terrorism in which, as David Graeber has argued, violence is "often the preferred weapon of the stupid."32

Modernity in this instance has been updated, wired and militarized. No longer content to play out its historical role of a modernized panopticon, it has become militarized and a multilayered source of insecurity, entertainment and commerce. In addition, this new stage of modernity is driven not only by the need to watch but also the will to punish. Phone calls, emails, social networks and almost every other vestige of electronic communication are now being collected and stored by corporate and government organizations such as the NSA and numerous other intelligence agencies. Snowden's exposure of the massive reach of the surveillance state with its biosensors, scanners, face recognition technologies, miniature drones, high speed computers, massive data mining capabilities and other stealth technologies made visible "the stark realities of disappearing privacy and diminishing liberties."33 But the NSA and the other 16 intelligence agencies are not the only threat to privacy, freedom and democracy. Corporations now have their own intelligence agencies and data mining offices and use these agencies and new surveillance technologies largely to spy on those who question the abuses of corporate power. The emergence of fusion centers exemplifies how power is now a mix of corporate, local, federal and global intelligence agencies, all sharing information that can be used by various agencies to stifle dissent and punish pro-democracy activists. What is clear is that this combination of gathering and sharing information often results in a lethal mix of anti-democratic practices in which surveillance now extends not only to potential terrorists but to all law-abiding citizens. Within this sinister web of secrecy, suspicion, state-sanctioned violence and illegality, the culture of authoritarianism thrives and poses a dangerous threat to democratic freedoms and rights. It also poses a threat to those outside the United States who, in the name of national security, are subject to "a grand international campaign with drones and special operations forces that is generating potential terrorists at every step."34 Behind this veil of concentrated power and secrecy lies not only a threat to privacy rights but the very real threat of violence on both a domestic and global level.

# LINK – Military Drones

**Regulating the use of drones normalizes their existence and locks in place violent impulses inherent to the legal system**

Trombly 12 [Dan, Associate Analyst @ Caerus Analytics, National Security/International Affairs Analyst, “The Drone War Does Not Take Place,” NOVEMBER 16, 2012, http://slouchingcolumbia.wordpress.com/2012/11/16/the-drone-war-does-not-take-place]

I’ll try to make this a bit shorter than my usual fare on the subject, but let me be clear about something. As much as I and many others inadvertently use the term, there is no such thing as drone war. There is no nuclear war, no air war, no naval war. There isn’t really even irregular war. There’s just war. There is, of course, drone warfare, just as there is nuclear warfare, aerial warfare, and naval warfare. This is verging on pedantry, but the use of language does matter. The changing conduct and character of war should not be confused with its nature, as Colin Gray strives to remind us in so many of his writings. When we believe that some aspect of warfare changes the nature of war – whether we do so to despair its ethical descent or praise its technological marvels, or to try to objectively discern some new and irreversible reality – we lose sight of a logic that by and large endures in its political and conceptual character. Hence the title (with some, but not too much, apology to Baudrillard). There is no drone war, there is only the employment of drones in the various wars we fight under the misleading and conceptually noxious “War on Terror.” Why does this matter? To imbue a weapons system with the political properties of the policy employing it is fallacious, and to assume its mere presence institutes new political realities relies on a denial of facts and context. This remains the case with drones. The character of wars waged with drones is different – the warfare is different – but the nature of these wars do not change, and very often this argument obscures the wider military operations occurring. Long before the first drone strikes occurred in Somalia, America was very much at war there. Before their availability in that theater, the U.S. had deployed CIA and SOF assets to the region. It supported Ethiopia’s armies and it helped bankroll and coordinate proxy groups, whether they were Somali TFG units, militias, or private contractors. It bombarded select Somali targets with everything from naval guns to AC-130 gunships to conventional strike aircraft. It deployed JSOC teams to capture or kill Somalis. That at some point the U.S. acquired a new platform to conduct these strikes is not particularly relevant to the character of that war and even less to its nature. We sometimes assume drones inaugurate some new type of invincibility or some transcendental transformation of war as an enterprise of risk and mutual violence. We are incorrect to do so. The war in Somalia is certainly not risk free for the people who the U.S. employs or contracts to target these drones. It is not risk free for the militias, mercenaries, or military partners which follow up on the ground. Nor is it risk free for those who support the drones. Just ask Abu Talha al-Sudani, one of the key figures behind the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, who sent operatives to case Camp Lemonier and launch a commando raid – one which looks, in retrospect, very much like the one that crippled Marine aviation at Camp Bastion recently – that might have killed a great many U.S. personnel on a base then and now critical to American operations in the Horn of Africa and Gulf of Aden. The existence of risk is an inherent product of an enemy whose will to fight we have not yet overcome. The degree of that inherent risk – whether it is negligible or great – is a product of relative military capabilities and war’s multifarious external contexts. Looked at through this lens, it’s not drones that reduce U.S. political and material risk, it’s the basic facts of the conflict. In the right context, most any kind of military technology can significantly mitigate risks. A 19th century ironclad fleet could shell the coast of a troublesome principality with basic impunity. When Dewey said, “You may fire when ready, Gridley,” at Manila Bay, according to most history and much legend he lost only one man – due to heatstroke! – while inflicting grievous casualties on his out-ranged and out-gunned Spanish foes. That some historians have suggested Dewey may have concealed a dozen casualties by fudging them in with desertions, which were in any case were a far greater problem than casualties since the Navy was still in the habit of employing foreign sailors expendable by the political standards of the day is even more telling. Yes, there are always risks and almost always casualties even in the most unfair fights, but just as U.S. policymakers wrote off Asian sailors, they write off the victims of death squads which hunt down the chippers, spotters, and informants in Pakistan or the contractors training Puntland’s anti-piracy forces. And no, not even the American spooks are untouchable, the fallen at Camp Chapman are testament to that. This is hardly unique to drones or today’s covert wars. The CIA’s secret air fleet in Indochina lost men, too, and the Hmong suffered mightily for their aid to the U.S. in the Laotian civil war. The fall of Lima Site 85, by virtue or demerit of policy, resonated little with the American public but deeply marks the intelligence community and those branches of the military engaging in clandestine action. The wars we wage in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia are not drone wars any more than our war in Laos was an air war simply because Operation Barrel Roll’s bombers elicit more attention than the much more vulnerable prop-driven spotting aircraft or Vang Pao’s men on the ground. There is a certain hubris in thinking we can limit war by limiting its most infamous weapons systems. The taboo and treaties against chemical weapons perhaps saved men (but not the Chinese at Wuhan, nor the Allied and innocents downwind of the SS John Harvey at Bari) from one of the Great War’s particular horrors, but they did nothing appreciable to check the kind of war the Great War was, or the hypersanguinary consequences of its sequel but a generation later. The Predators and Reapers could have never existed, and very likely the U.S. would still be seeking ways to carry out its war against al Qaeda and its affiliates under the auspices of the AUMF in all of today’s same theaters. More might die from rifles, Tomahawks, Bofors guns or Strike Eagles’ JDAMs than remotely-launched Griffins, and the tempo of strikes would abate. But the same fundamental problems – the opaque decisions to kill, the esoteric legal justifications for doing so, the obtuse objectives these further – would all remain. Were it not for the exaggerated and almost myopic focus on “killer robots,” the U.S. public would likely pay far less attention to the victims, excesses, and contradictions. But blaming drones qua drones for these problems, or fearing their proliferation at home, makes little more sense than blaming helicopters for Vietnam, or fearing airmobile assaults when DC MPD’s MD-500s buzz over my neighborhood. That concern that proliferation of a weapons system equates to proliferation of the outcomes associated with them, without regard to context, is equally misleading. Nobody in America should fear the expansion of the Chinese UAV fleet because, like the U.S. UAV fleet, it is merely going to expand their ability to do what similar aircraft were already doing. Any country with modern air defenses can make mincemeat of drone-only sorties, and for that reason China, which unlike Yemen and Pakistan would not consent to wanton U.S. bombing of its countryside, need not fear drones. For an enormous number of geographical, political, and military reasons, the U.S. ought fear the “drone war” coming home even less. Drones do not grant a country the ability to conduct the kind of wars we conduct against AQAM. The political leverage to build bases and clear airspaces, and the military and intelligence capabilities to mitigate an asymmetric countermeasure operation do. If another country gains that ability to conduct them against a smaller country, even, it is not because they lacked the ability to put weapons on planes, but because of the full tapestry of national power and military capabilities gave them such an ability. It was not asymmetry in basic technical ability that made the U.S. submarine blockade of Japan so much more effective than the Axis’s attempts to do the same against America’s shores, but the total scope of the assets in the field and context of their use. It was not because of precedent or moral equivalence, or lack thereof that the Axis could bomb Britain or lose the ability to do so, but because of the cumulative effect of military capabilities and the judgments guiding them. What might expand the battlefield of a “drone war” is much the same. America’s enemies do not refrain from attacking bases in CONUS or targeting dissidents in the U.S. (not that they have not before), they wait for an opportunity and practical reason to do so, and that has very little to do with drones in particular and even less the nature of the war itself. Fearing that the mere use of a weapons system determines the way in which our enemies will use it without regard to this context is not prophetic wisdom. It is quasi-Spenglerian hyperventilation that attributes the decision to use force to childlike mimesis rather than its fundamentally political purposes. Iran and Russia do not wait on drones to conduct extrajudicial targeted killings, and indeed drones would be of much less use to them in their own political contexts. Focusing on drones and the nature of targeted killings as some sort of inherent link ignores those contexts and ultimately does a disservice to understanding of wars past, present, and future, and by doing so, does little help – and possibly a great deal of harm – to understanding how to move forward.

# LINK – Legal Brueprint

**This refusal of legal blueprints is the only strategy capable of avoiding authoritarian cooption. The politics of the 1nc may result in any number of imperceptible forms of political resistance, including but not limited to the ones suggested by:**

**Arrigo 8** [“Revolution in Penology Rethinking the Society of Captives,” Rowman & Littlefield: New York, Bruce A. Arrigo is professor of crime, law, and society in the Department of Criminal Justice at the University of North Carolina, Charlotte, Dragan Milovanovic is professor in the Justice Studies Department at Northeastern Illinois University, 2008]

We have not attempted to provide a blueprint or to offer concrete proposals for a socius yet to come. As Nick Dyer-Witheford (1999, 190) proposes, the danger is that any preconceived socius may result in authoritarian outcomes. In other words, deviation from the conceptualization may be resisted and be regarded as counterrevolutionary. Hence, consistent with Deleuze and Guattari, we have suggested how certain lines of flight might emerge that undermine (deterritorialize) closure and capture so that a more liberating socius1 could develop (reterritorialize). To remain true to our position, we must accept the potentials that inhere within each of us and, as such, cannot in advance limit these becomings. Indeed, following Dyer-Witheford (1999, 191), "the aim should be to create a space where a diversity of social, cultural, and economic ways of being can coexist/'2 However, we still need to think through possible alternatives, weighing with appropriate ethical consideration the competing options to which we are drawn and for which the struggle, the revolution, in penology is sustained (Dyer-Witheford 1999, 191). In this direction, we are particularly mindful of some key suggestions, some "battlefield maps," offered bv Dyer-Witheford (1999, 192-218).

We have seen that the war machine must engage various molar levels. At the more "micro" level, personal strategies for daily survival and challenge are needed. At the more "meso" level, alternative networks and organizations are desirable. At the more "macro" level, either a reformist remedial or radical reformist strategy is recommended (see Henry and Milovanovic 1996).

We return to the constitutive elements of COREL sets/assemblages for guidance at these various "levels." We recall that each comprises (1) a material component ("machinic processes" that produce cuts and breaks or flows of matter/energy providing the raw material on which expressive forms work),3 (2) an expressive component (the manifest forms—discursive and nondiscursive), (3) terri totalization (tendency toward molar structurations and capture in the form of axioms), and (4) deterritotalization (tendency to differentiate, dissipate, break apart). We also recall that iteration and nonlinearitv prevail in terms of linkages and effects. Let us briefly provide some possible directions in producing change that may privilege active molecular forces and becoming.

Suggestive at the more "micro" level is Massumi (1992, 103-106), who offers five recommendations. We provide some additional thoughts that augment and amplify his observations.

1. 'Stop the world/' Whereas being concerns stasis, repetition of the same, reactive forms of desire, becoming is about interruption, dis-connections, the creation of spaces within which new relations are (and can be) actively constructed. Thus, Mary's world, although attaining homeostasis and cyclical repetitions, must be interrupted, It is within the interruptions ("zones of indeterminacy") that epiphanies arise.4 Lacan's (1991) combined discourse of the analyst/hysteric., integrated with Paulo Freire's (1973) work on diaiogical pedagogy, indicates that interventionists, cultural revolutionaries, may be catalysts in accessing, mobilizing, and retrieving the subaltern's desire for more genuine expression. The suggestion here is not that these interventionists function as revolutionary vanguards armed with the "appropriate" understandings (master discourse) of struggle, alienation, exploitation, victimization, and the like; rather, they nomadically participate in engaged, ongoing dialogical encounters.

2. “Cherish derelict spaces" Within a socius and its molar forms, spaces always already exist that do not find themselves pacified—regimented, linearized, striated, axiomatized, These are "zones of indeterminacy" (Bergson 1998) where far-from-equilibrium conditions prevail, where with some perturbation dissipative forms will appear as emergents, These are "autonomous zones" that can be the basis of an alternative becoming. The autonomia movement in Italy during the 1960s and 1970s attempted to exploit this movement's revolutionary potential (see Negri 1984, 1999). Similarly, Foucault's5 later works addressed "limit experiences," He argued that the only genuine direction to recapture subjectivity was in transgressing the various boundaries/limits imposed (inscribed) on the body (see Miller 2000; Lyng 2005, 39^7). These transgressive moments, crossing boundaries, "involved experiments in self-creation . . , forms of resistance . , , acts of liberation" (Lyng 2005, 45^47). Moreover, critical race theorists have called for the creation of such alternative spaces within classroom settings where assumptions of the other can be challenged in supportive ways (Matsuda 1998). Attending to the subaltern, as with the case of Mary, is by definition about boundary crossing; still, this activity is continuously subject to the regimented molar expressive forms. However, within the edifice of repetition and larval reactive flows, cracks always exist within which alternatives may arise (Goffman 1961). In other words, these cracks can be the basis for replacement material ("machinic cuts") and expressive forms.

Drucilia Cornell (1998) and bell hooks (1994) have also offered the idea of protections for an "imaginary domain." As Cornell (1998, 8, 111) notes, it "is the space of the 'as if in which we imagine who we might be if we made ourselves our own ends and claimed ourselves as our own persons." [t is the "location of recovery" (hooks 1994, 238), It is where we may imagine an otherwise, a becoming, a person yet to come.6

3. "Study camouflage/'' "Seeming to be what you are" allows the inhabitant of preconstructed identities (discursive subject-positions) to provide the illusion that she or he is in fact what is dictated, yet at the same time provides the person critical understanding of her or his molar restrictions. This is in accord with Richard Rorty's (1989) "liberal ironist," whereby molar categories are used in everyday practice but understood as the reifying entities that they are. How-ever, these molecular responses are easily transformed into their molar forms: one becomes that from which one previously remained distant. For the subaltern, then, the difficult task is to establish some distance from the identities forced upon the self: one is more than a category in all its expressive forms (consider Mary's categories as a poor, black woman); one's identity is not rooted in being but has potential in becoming.

Desistance theory is evocative here as well. One's postcarceral adaptation will follow a nonlinear pathway but will provide numerous junctures for breaking out of the crime-prison-crime cycle that represents the pains of imprisonment. These singularities are the occasion for symmetry breaking and alternative lines of flight. Hence, camouflaging allows both outward-appearing acquiescence to regimes that would produce the docile body, while simultaneously making possible instances for a reexploration of the self, fleeting oc-currences of luciditv, turning points, coupling moments, and novel molecular flow.s

4. "Side and straddle/' "When in doubt, sidestep," says Massumi (1992, 106). In other wTords, given compelling daily moments to challenge repressive structures, and given the molar forces that police their

form, failure often awaits those who on every occasion fight to dis-mantle the molar forms. However, waiting on the sidelines for the right battle may, over time, produce acquiescence and molar identifications. One's sword becomes rusted in the scabbard, and the occasion for its drawing may find diminished skills in its use. "Charging straight ahead may be necessary and effective at times, but as a general principle it is as self-defeating as uncritical [in its] acceptance of reform" (Massumi 1992, 106). In other words, stepping sideways may be more beneficial in the long run than constant daily challenges. This notion of "tranversality" is found in Guattari (1984, 2001) and in Deleuze and Guattari (1983, 1987). As Massumi (1992, 73) tells us, "An effectively revolutionary movement establishes many other circuits: reform-confrontation, molarity-minority, being- becoming, camouflage-showing oneself, rationality-imagination, and many permutations of these." In other words, for the subaltern and for the activist, developing the ability to transgress various boundaries while providing the appearance of a subject committed to her or his discursive subject-position is encouraged.7

5. "Come out." Massumi (1992, 106) advocates, "Throw off your camouflage as soon as you can still survive. What one comes out of is identity. What one comes into is greater transformational potential" In other words, molar identities must be discarded at opportunities for the development of molecular identities. It is here where machinic cuts and expressive forms find alternative development. For the subaltern, it may very well be that the daily violent imposition of static identities by social-control agencies regularly preclude "coming out." But moments exist in which a nonstatic identity may find expression, and these should be the basis of cultivation.

To Maussumi's five suggestions, we offer several others^:

6. Seek and form alliances. Hardt and Negri's (2004, xiv) treatise on the "multitude" indicates that the global society witnesses increasing differences that cannot be reduced to a singular unity; "the multitude is a multiplicity of all these singular differences" (xiv). Accordingly, while commonalities can only be momentary, they are the basis of concerted and focused struggle. Postmodernity both produces ever more refined technologies for growth and control and the possibilities of reappropriating these resources for struggles. Thus, "network struggles" replace class struggles: the former represents a "polycentric" form of opposition^ it produces both "new subjectivities and new forms of life" (Hardt and Negri 2004, 83). The Zapatista uprising in Chiapas is a clear example. The new struggles, according to Dyer-Withe ford (1999, 187), "would involve constructing a system of 'multivalent engagement' between movements." And, following Guattari and Negri (1990, 123), "each of [these] shows itself to be capable of unleashing irreversible molecular revolutions and of linking itself to either limited or unlimited molar struggles" (see also Dyer- Witheford 1999, 187).Jt1 The key, then, becomes coming up with creative ways of developing linkages via the technological apparatus (i.e., Internet) that is transforming our lives.

7. Be a jazz player. Everywhere that formal rationality takes hold, we find the need to become members of harmonious orchestras. In response, some advocate instead that we become jazz players (Holland 1999), Improvisation in jazz does not necessitate a leader; rather, members vary their play within an overall developing motif (Holland 1999).EJ This conforms with nomadism and the rhizome as described by Deleuze and Guattari, This is not a repetition of the same (stasis) but a perpetual becoming, a continuous transformation of self, society, and other. It is a continuous investment in difference. In this direction, Braidotti (2002, 2006) has developed a postmodern ethics she terms the "ethics of sustainability." This version of moral contemplation and action argues against modernity's linear and unitary conception of the subject; instead, it advances a nonunitary notion ("nomadic subjectivity") as more productive than its counterpart, This nomadic subjectity as the embodiment of an ethic of sustainability regresses into neither relativism nor nihilism but is interconnected with alterity, community, contingencies, and experimentation. Only in this way can continuous transformations (molecular revolution, continuous becoming) be omnipresent and ubiquitous. Additionally, Braidotti (2002, 2006) indicates that it is an "ethic of accountability" that affirms active forces and positive passions conducive to becoming. Consequently, actions that sustain continuous molecular transformations are identified as those that should be advocated for and practiced. Conversely, those that arrest these expressions are deemed "unhealthy,"

8. Invest in social judo. In response to harms of repression and reduction, rather than responding with further investments in hierarchical power to overcome, which adds to the overall harm, we advocate a social judo (see Henry and Milovanovic 1996).J- This is the power of domination turned against itself. Consider, for example, Foucault's (1977a) classic study of panopticism in which asymmetrical power relations have been born. More specifically, consider the panopticon designed by Bentham, a circular configuration with cells on the outside and a central tower in the middle for observation. Foucault showed how this was a new form of siuveiilance that was asymmetrical (the

seen do not see the seers). Foucault overlooked, however, the inherent power of social judo within this scenario. An inmate, after being officially counted ("on the count": he is asked to step outside of his cell for an official body count), is told to return to his cell, and the cell doors then close. But what if he stands outside, be it alone, in an act of resistance?J3 In this instance, all—prisoners, guards, other staff, any civilians working, and so forth—will be witness to anything that follows. In other words, a symmetrical form of power has been reestablished, albeit only temporary. Social judo is a strategy that can reduce harms of reduction and repression by the act of challenging the asymmetrical forms of power without necessarily increasing the overall amount of harm inflicted.

9, Become-other. At the core of a socius is a point attractor, becoming- the-same, a continuously reinforced molar outcome. Becoming- other, becoming-minoritarian is a voyage toward otherness. It is re-leasing the body from stasis and opening it up to what it can do. It is a process of deterritorialization and reterritorialization. It concerns "challenging conventional body boundaries, taking the risk of becoming indiscernible as a social subject and unsettling a coherent sense of personal self" (Lorraine 1999, 183; see also Grosz 1994), It is to place oneself in the molecular domain and among the active forces. It is to disrupt repetition and to embrace differences. It is to open oneself up to alternative lines of flight and new outcome basins as a result of symmetry-breaking bifurcations along the way. It is a death in the past and a rebirth to the future.

10. Be active; be joyful Not to be confused with the much popularized lyric "Don't worry, be happy," Deleuze's study of "what the body can do," focusing most especially on Spinoza and Nietzsche, identifies the joyful passion and the active as an ethical practice (see Hardt 1993). The body has both powers to affect and powers to be affected. Active affections are those that are connected with our powers to act (Hardt 1993, 92); passive affections are linked to the lack of that power. Active affections allow the body to move toward what it can do; passive affections mobilize the body to suffering and despair. Joyful encounters are those that add to the power to act (Hardt 1993, 94), Joyful passions arise from relations to others. Accordingly, we may draw from Nietzsche's ethic—become active—and from Spinoza's— become joyful (Hardt 1993, 96). Thus, for Deleuze's ethic: "Become joyful; become active" (Hardt 1993, 119). Admittedly, we might pre-maturely want to dismiss this ethic given the harms of repression and reduction that abound in the socius; however, moments exist in which this active joyful ethic can be cultivated and, with other culti-vations, can produce more empowerment, more elation—more lines of flight that are transformative.

11. Cultivate an ethic of care. A feminist ethic of care has been developed by Carol Gilligan (1982), Grace Clement (1998), and Nel Noddings (2003).14 It is a form of substantive justice that centers on context, uniqueness, attachments, human connectedness, the maintenance of relationships, mutuality, and the concrete other. These values stand in contrast to formal, abstract rationality and its concerns for formal equality or inequality. This care ethic signifies a duty to the other as recognized in the work of Emmanuel Levinas,1^ Jacques Derrida, and Francois Lyotard.16 Law and justice reflect different assumptions; law is more connected to economic calculation; justice is more connected to a gift. Justice is something we owe to the other and, hence, is never calculable.17 It is a duty bestowed without payment. This suggests that we cultivate a sense of otherness, even as a capitalist socius demands a rational calculating individual with only instrumental concerns for the other. This dialectical play is omnipresent; however, we advocate the development of a personal reorientation to the other, even while recognizing the formal rational forms of justice that abound. We need to think beyond the latter basin of attraction and intuit methods and forms by which the former predominate. We need greater experimentation in becoming- other.

# Link – Apocalyptic Imagery

**Apocalyptic scenarios are the perfection of biopolitics, reducing us to passive subjects in the service of state violence**

**Coviello 99** PETER, BOWDOIN COLLEGE, “APOCALYPSE FROM NOW ON,” IN *QUEER FRONTIERS*, ED. BOONE, P. 40-41

Perhaps. But to claim that American culture is at present decisively postnuclear is not to say that the world we inhabit is in any way post-apocalyptic. Apocalypse, as I began by saying, changed—it did not go away. And here I want to hazard my second assertion: if, in the nuclear age of yesteryear, apocalypse signified an event threatening everyone and everything with (in Jacques Derrida's suitably menacing phrase) <41> "remainderless and a-symbolic destruction,"6 then in the postnuclear world apocalypse is an affair whose parameters are definitively local. In shape and in substance, apocalypse is defined now by the affliction it brings somewhere else, always to an "other" people whose very pres-ence might then be written as a kind of dangerous contagion, threaten-ing the safety and prosperity of a cherished "general population." This fact seems to me to stand behind Susan Sontag's incisive observation, from 1989, that, "Apocalypse is now a long-running serial: not 'Apoca-lypse Now' but 'Apocalypse from Now On.'"7 The decisive point here in the perpetuation of the threat of apocalypse (the point Sontag goes on, at length, to miss) is that **apocalypse is ever present because, as an element in a vast economy of power, it is ever useful.** That is, **through the perpetual threat of destruction**—through the constant reproduc-tion of the figure of apocalypse—**agencies of power ensure their au-thority to act on and through the bodies of a particular population.** No one turns this point more persuasively than Michel Foucault, who in the final chapter of his first volume of The History of Sexuality addresses himself to the problem of a power that is less repressive than pro-ductive, less life-threatening than, in his words, "life-administering." Power, he contends, "exerts a positive influence on life . .. [and] en-deavors to administer, optimize, and multiply it, subjecting it to pre-cise controls and comprehensive regulations." In his brief comments on what he calls "the atomic situation," however, Foucault insists as well that the productiveness of modern power must not be mistaken for a uniform repudiation of violent or even lethal means. For **as "man-agers of life and survival, of bodies and the race," agencies of modern power presume to act "on the behalf of the existence of everyone" What-soever might be construed as a threat to life and survival in this way serves to authorize any expression of force, no matter how invasive or, indeed, potentially annihilating**. "If genocide is indeed the dream of modern power," Foucault writes, "this is not because of a recent return to the ancient right to kill; it is because power is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population."8 For a state that would arm itself not with the power to kill its population, but with a more comprehensive power over the patterns and functioning of its collective life, the threat of an apoca-lyptic demise, nuclear or otherwise, seems a civic initiative that can scarcely be done without.

# Link – Legal Reform

**Jumping to include legal reform whitewashes the biopolitical security project and sidelines criticism**

Krasmann 12 [Susanne, Institute for Criminological Research, University of Hamburg, “Law’s knowledge: On the susceptibility and resistance of legal practices to security matters” Theoretical Criminology 16 (4) p. 380-382]

In the face of these developments, a new debate on how to contain governmental interference in the name of security has emerged. What is remarkable about this debate is that, on the one hand, it aims at establishing more civil and human rights and attendant procedural safeguards that allow for systematically calling into question the derogation of laws and the implementation of new laws in the name of security. On the other hand, it recognizes the existence of a new dimension of threats, particularly in the aftermath of the terror attacks of 11 September 2001. As John Ferejohn and Pasquale Pasquino (2004: 228), for instance, contend: We are faced, nowadays, with serious threats to the public safety that can occur anywhere and that cannot terminate definitively. … If we think that the capacity to deal effectively with emergencies is a precondition for republican government, then it is necessary to ask how emergency powers can be controlled in modern circumstances. Adequate legal frameworks and institutional designs are required that would enable us to ‘reconcile’ security with (human) rights, as Goold and Lazarus (2007b: 15) propose, and enduring emergency situations with the rule of law. Traditional problems in the relationship between law and security government within this debate form a point of departure of critical considerations:2 emergency government today, rather than facing the problem of gross abuses of power, has to deal with the persistent danger of the exceptional becoming normal (see Poole, 2008: 8). Law gradually adjusts to what is regarded as ‘necessary’.3 Hence, law not only constrains, but at the same time also authorizes governmental interference. Furthermore, mainstream approaches that try to balance security and liberty are rarely able, or willing, to expose fully the trade-offs of their normative presuppositions: ‘[T]he metaphor of balance is used as often to justify and defend changes as to challenge them’ (Zedner, 2005: 510). Finally, political responses to threats never overcome the uncertainty that necessarily accompanies any decision addressing future events. To ignore this uncertainty, in other words, is to ignore the political moment any such decision entails, thus exempting it from the possibility of dissent. Institutional arrangements that enforce legislative control and enable citizens to claim their rights are certainly the appropriate responses to the concern in question, namely that security gradually seizes political space and transforms the rule of law in an inconspicuous manner. They establish political spaces of dispute and provide sticking points against all too rapidly launched security legislation, and thus may foster a ‘culture of justification’, as David Dyzenhaus (2007) has it: political decisions and the exercise of state power are to be ‘justified by law’, in a fundamental sense of a commitment to ‘the principles of legality and respect for human rights’ (2007: 137). Nonetheless, most of these accounts, in a way, simply add more of the same legal principles and institutional arrangements that are well known to us. To frame security as a public good and ensure that it is a subject of democratic debate, as Ian Loader and Neil Walker (2007) for example demand, is a promising alternative to denying its social relevance. The call for security to be ‘civilized’, though, once again echoes the truly modern project of dealing with its inherent discontents. The limits of such a commitment to legality and a political ‘culture of justification’ (so termed for brevity) will be illustrated in the following section. Those normative endeavours will be challenged subsequently by a Foucauldian account of law as practice. Contrary to the idea that law can be addressed as an isolated, ideal body and thus treated like an instrument according to normative aspirations, the present account renders law’s reliance on forms of knowledge more discernable. Law is susceptible, in particular to security matters. As a practice, it constantly transforms itself and, notably, articulates its normative claims depending upon the forms of knowledge brought into play. Contrary to the prevailing debate on emergency government, this perspective enables us, on the one hand, to capture how certain forms of knowledge become inscribed into the law in a way that goes largely unnoticed. This point will be discussed on the example of automated surveillance technologies, which facilitate a particular rationality of pre-emptive action. The conception of law as a practice, on the other hand, may also be understood as a tool of critique and dissent. The recent torture debate is an extreme example of this, whereby torture can be regarded as a touchstone of law’s resistance to its own abrogation. Law and reasoning The idea that a political and juridical ‘culture of justification’ would be able to bring about the desired results should be treated with caution—for one thing, with regard to the particular logic of legal reasoning and justification and, for another thing, because of at least two empirical observations that shed light on law’s limitations vis-a-vis the governance of security. First of all, the establishment of a ‘culture of justification’ itself presupposes what has yet to arise, namely a common concern about governmental encroachment in the name of security and a willingness of all parties to join in that discourse, if not share in its related arguments. This presupposition, to be sure, is indispensable for inspiring communication and facilitating the exchange of arguments. Moreover, in order to take effect the tried and true liberal legal principles, like that of proportionality and necessity, clearly need to be concretized by reasoning about actual cases. Yet, the assumption of a common concern goes hand in hand with a general trust in a form of communicative reason that will allow for transparency eventually on the matters at stake. Reason and to reason within ‘a transparent, structured process of analysis to determine what degree of erosion is justifiable, by what measure, in what circumstances, and for how long’ (Zedner, 2005: 522), is considered basic to the solution. However, just as legal norms and principles are open to interpretation, they do not determine any normative orientations underlying the interpretative process. As Benjamin Goold and Liorna Lazarus (2007b: 11; see also Poole, 2008: 16) observe: ‘[P]re-emptive measures designed to increase security can never be truly objective or divorced from our political concerns and values.’ Typical for the acknowledgement of competing claims still to be weighed (Zedner, 2005: 508), therefore, is that they end up being couched in a rather appealing rhetoric (‘we should’, ‘judges should’). In a liberal vein, this requires a resorting to the least intrusive measures. Competing claims are thus relegated to the normative framework of balance (see Waldron, 2003; Zedner, 2005: 528). As regards the empirical observations, there is, first, a move in security legislation that is noticeable in western countries in which the threshold of governmental intervention has been gradually disposed in order to forestall actual offences, concrete suspicion and danger. 9/11 may be regarded as a catalyst here, as well as the fight against terrorism in general. But rather than being recent phenomena, these transformations in fact represent a continuity over decades in the identification of ever new dimensions of threats, from sexual offenders and organized crime right up to transnational terrorism.4 Although a tendency can be discerned, this is not to suggest that there have not been any disruptions to it. Civil and human rights organizations have time and again countered these developments, and so have higher-court rulings. Even new basic rights have been established.5 Though successful, these processes were unable to thwart the general trend of making private space accessible to surveillance in a way that would have been unimaginable decades ago. In this sense, paradoxically, new basic rights are rather indicators of new spaces of vulnerability. A closer look at higher courts’ decisions on security legislation and additional recommendations by human rights bodies suggests that these lead to the amendment of the laws in question but not necessarily to a change in practice. ‘For, as law becomes ever more closely intertwined with a proliferating assemblage of expertise, risk consulting, administration, and discretion, it inhabits an inescapable paradox’, as Louise Amoore (2008: 849) neatly put it. Law for civil and human rights activists and lawyers is the very medium for challenging governmental encroachment, and, notably, the ‘rule of law’ represents the very principle to be defended. Under review, however, law encounters its own legislation—the modes of risk management it once itself authorized, and that will now have to be amended in accordance not only with the principles of the rule of law but also with the identified necessities of security government.

# LINK – Law/Legal Reform

**The laws of the U.S. puts us in the psychological trap of the law that normalizes it maintenance –**

**Kenneth Nunn speaks about in 1997**

Contesting Eurocentricity is primarily a cultural struggle. It calls for the

creation of a separate cultural base that values and responds to a different

cultural logic than does Eurocentricity. Aime Cesaire, the great West Indian

Pan-Africanist, understood the importance of the cultural struggle and its

potential:

Any political and social regime that suppresses the self-determination of a

people, must, at the same time, kill the creative power of the people...

Wherever there is colonization, the entire people have been emptied of their

culture and their creativity... It is certain, then, that the elements that

structure the cultural life of a colonized people [must also] retard or

degenerate the work of the colonial regime. n247

    First, the law accomplishes ideological work as it embraces Eurocentric

cultural styles and celebrates European historical traditions. The law and legal

institutions, through the artful use of ritual and authority, uphold the

legitimacy of European dominance. The constant self-congratulatory references to

the majesty of the law, the continual praise of European thinkers, the

unconscious reliance on European traditions, values and ways of thinking, all

become unremarkable and expected. The law operates as a key component in a vast

and mainly invisible signifying system in support of white supremacy. The law is

even more capable of structuring thought because its masquerade that

it is fair, even-handed, and impartial is rarely contested. Consequently,

the law works as an effective "tool for psychological and ideological

enslavement.”

# Link – Fear Rhetoric Stifles Dissent

**Practices of security over state sovereignty are enacted by politicians to establish an authority effect.**

**Bigo 2002** (Didier, Professor of International Relations at Sciences-Po, Paris, “Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease”)

**Sovereignty and security cannot be conceived merely as analytical tools of social reality; they must be seen as categories demanding genealogical analysis and linked to a particular way of governing— that of the so-called Westphalian state and its modern (Hegelian or Weberian) variations. The contemporary revival of sovereignty in political debate is thus to be understood as the deployment of a narrative, with the specific purpose of playing with positions of symbolic authority so as to force social practices to bend in a required way. Sovereignty implies a recognition of these positions; but when they are contested, the authority effect cannot survive for long. The authority effect does not assert itself, but is established intersubjectively. The same goes for the argument about security. Practices of security are not given by nature but are the outcome of political acts by politicians and specialists on threat management.**

**Political rhetoric in the United States works as a political demonology where they can construct the migrant as the enemy.**

**Bigo 2002** (Didier, Professor of International Relations at Sciences-Po, Paris, “Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease”)

**The framing of the state as a body endangered by migrants is a political narrative activated for the purpose of political games in ways that permit each politician to distance himself or herself from other politicians, but within the same rules of the game. It is a social construction useful for the politicization of migration. Murray**

**Edelman has explained how the social construct of the political spectacle works. He has demonstrated how the construction of situations as problems is useful for politicians: the politicians can manage them in order to justify their own authority. It enables them, for example, to negate other problems or to transform structural difficulties into easy targets. All these elements and practices are important to explain the securitization of immigrants. Michael Rogin—to cite one example—has developed the idea that in various countries, and especially in the United States, political rhetoric works as a political demonology through which politicians construct a figure of the enemy to generate a countersubversive discourse and a law-and-order program.**

# Link – Fear Rhetoric Stifles Dissent

**Professionals have the advantage of exercising authority and invoke institutional knowledge about threats.**

**Bigo 2002** (Didier, Professor of International Relations at Sciences-Po, Paris, “Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease”)

**The dialectical relationship between political professionals and the professional managers of unease implies that the institutions working on unease not only respond to threat but also determine what is and what is not a threat or a risk. They do that as "professionals." Their agents are invested with the office of defining and prioritizing threats. They classify events according to their categories. While car accidents are currently classified as a misfortune rather than a threat to be fought, some subjects are constructed by the security professionals as threats or risks that they have to control. Of course, some "amateurs" of the security process (associations, churches, parties not integrated in the decision-making process, ad hoc spokesmen of social movements) can intervene in this game of security and insecurity, challenging the framing of migrant or asylum seekers as a risk, but professionals have the advantage of exercising authority.49 They are invested with the institutional knowledge about threats and with a range of technologies suitable for responding to these threats. They benefit from the belief that they know what "we" (nonprofessionals, amateurs) do not know and that they have specific modes of action of a technical nature that we are not supposed to know about.**

# Link – Bio-Terror

**The rhetoric of bioterror as a threat to life enables the state’s acquisition of biopolitical control, and justifies wholesale slaughter in the name of survival.**

**Thacker 2007-**

Associate Professor, School of Literature, Communication, & Culture, Georgia Institute of Technology

(Eugene, “Nomos, nosos and bios in the body politic,” <http://www.culturemachine.net/index.php/cm/article/view/25/32>)

For Foucault, biopolitics involves three main processes, working in concert. The first is a redeployment of medical knowledge concerning the biology of populations. Here the notion of population becomes the bearer of all medical and social specificity. Biopolitics 'tends to treat the "population" as a mass of living and coexisting beings who present particular biological and pathological traits and who thus come under specific knowledge and technologies' (Foucault, 1997: 71). But this process of accounting for the population as simultaneously political and medical implies a certain quantitative sophistication. Thus, in addition to a medical view of the population, there is a second element, which is the development of a set of numerical, statistical, and informatic means of defining and thus managing the population. This is the biology of large numbers, which has its beginnings, for instance, in the regular use of mortality tables kept by parishes in 17th century England (Porter, 1997: 236-38). Its aim is 'to rationalize the problems presented to governmental practice by the phenomena characteristic of a group of living human beings constituted as a population: health, sanitation, birthrate, longevity, race' (Foucault, 1997: 73). Finally, a last element is required for biopolitics to function, and that is an infrastructure for performing this ongoing statistics of the population. This is where what Foucault calls governmentality, or the art of governing, comes into play, in which 'the movement that brings about the emergence of population as a datum' provides the conditions for 'an objective of governmental techniques' (Foucault 2000: 219). The concerns of population characteristics in light of political economy -- the mercantilist view that the health of the population equals the wealth of the population -- is but one example of governmental management of biopolitical concerns. But it is in this last element that Foucault's points about biopolitics have the most resonance for our current context of bioterrorism and emerging infectious disease. In his Collège lectures, Foucault says more about the governmentality specific to biopolitics. He asks, 'How can a power such as this kill, if it is true that its basic function is to improve life, to prolong its duration, to improve its chances, to avoid accidents, and to compensate for failings?' (2003: 254). In other words, what is the relation between older forms of sovereignty and the emerging, modern biopolitical practices of public health policy, hospital reform, the professionalization of medicine, and the methods of statistics and demographics? Foucault offers one response, which is that 'the acquisition of power over man insofar as man is a living being, that the biological came under State control, that there was at least a certain tendency that leads to what might be termed State control of the biological' (2003: 239-40). But how is the exceptional character of sovereign power instantiated in such decentralized systems, in which the bureaucratic management of numbers and bodies takes hold? There must be some set of principles for allowing, in exceptional circumstances, the introduction of sovereign power. In other words, there must be some set of conditions that can be identified as a threat, such that a corresponding state of emergency can be claimed, in which the formerly decentralized apparatus of biopolitics suddenly constricts into the exception of sovereignty. 'It is at this moment that racism is inscribed as the basic mechanism of power, as it is exercised in modern States' (2003: 254). But I would argue that Foucault means 'racism' here in a specific, medical and biological sense. Racism in this sense is a biologically-inflected political relation in which war is rendered as fundamentally biological: Wars are no longer waged in the name of a sovereign who must be defended; they are waged on behalf of the existence of everyone; entire populations are mobilized for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name of life necessity: massacres have become vital Â… the existence in question is no longer the juridical existence of sovereignty; at stake is the biological existence of a population. (1978: 137) In a curious turn of phrase, Foucault later calls this a 'democratization of sovereignty,' a condition in which the sovereign state of emergency emerges through a widespread and generalized threat to the population (2003: 37). In such conditions, both a medical-biological view of the population, and a statistical-informatic means of accounting for the population, converge in the identification of potential threats and possible measures of security. In a sense, it is war that acts as the hinge between population and information, but a war that always puts at stake the biological existence of the population (and thus nation). The body natural, even as it serves as an analogy for the body politic, is always what is fundamentally at stake in the body politic.

# Link – Terrorism

**The problematic of global terrorism transcends state analysis – only our alternative provides a means to understand the international arena because terrorism transcends all technologies of risk**

**Kessler** Sociology at Beilefeld **& Daase** Poli Sci at U of Munich **2008** Oliver & Christopher Alternatives p EBSCOhost

Analyzing terrorism from a world risk-society perspective high- lights dynamics that, according to Beck,6 expose the false promises of neoliberalism.'' The catastrophic features of the attacks highlight the "incalculability" of terrorism, and the very organization of terrorists in networks contradicts the logic of international politics as "border" management between states. Therefore, according to Beck, terrorism as a new kind of global risk breaks out of the spatial and temporal conditions of the nation-state.^ As a consequence, traditional categories lose their meaning: What happened on 9/11 represents a fundamental shift in the political vocabulary of inside-outside, of solidarity and territory. Their old meaning no longer captures the current situation as the attacks were neither crime nor war, neither public nor private. Consequently, we do not even have a language to conceptualize the basic problems—despite the fact that the silence of words was quickly replaced by a war machinery and gross simplification of enemy images, constructed by governments and intelligence agencies without and beyond public discourse and democratic participation.

A different approach to risk has emerged from writings inspired by Michel Foucault.'O The emphasis is less on the evolutionary contours of contemporary society but on power understood as govemmentality, on how particular ways of thinking and representing risks shape subjects and subjectivity. By treating life as being segmented into various fields in which specific "technologies of the self shape the subjects, Foucault seeks to make visible the hidden assumption of modernity itself: a separation between power and reason. While reason is about the emancipation of the self, about freedom and necessity, power is usually described in terms of domination, as the capacity to pursue one's interests despite resistance.

By seeing knowledge and power as irremediably linked, Foucault analyzes the ways in which power constructs identities and "reason." In this sense, as Aradau and van Munster have recently argued, terrorism gives rise to a new dispositif that imposes a new truth regime." While risk analysis traditionally focuses on authority of knowledge and statistical technologies in shaping the future, terrorism surpasses these technologies. Rather, the rationality of catastrophic risk translates into policies that actively seek to prevent future catastrophes—that is, policies that try to control the future via the precautionary principle.

This new risk paradigm links four rationalities that stand behind the current fight against terrorism: "zero risk, worst case scenario, shifting burden of proof and serious and irreversible damage. "12 This new risk paradigm leads to an extensive surveillance system targeted against one's own population, blurring the distinction between "potential terrorists" and "innocent neighbors." Their interpretation differs from Beck's approach insofar as

if Beck saw the insurability and incalculability of risks as the limit of govemmentality, a pretence supported by expert systems, a Foucauldian approach understands precautionary risk as a dispositif that attempts to "tame" the limit and govern what appears to be ungovernable.13Link – Terrorism to Biopolitics

**Their attempt to manage terrorism engages in radical violence**

**Dillon** University of Lancaster **2007** Michael International Political Sociology wiley

Governing terror first references the massive global security effort that is now devoted to the war on terror. Its primary purpose is to bring terror within the political rationalities and calculative control of western security technologies with the aim of destroying it, or reducing it to manageable proportions. In that sense, the aim is to eliminate terror through the advance of good government or make terror at least governable through the advance of security technologies. In the process, there has been a massive extension and intensification of the political rationalities and governing technologies of security into almost every aspect of western life. At the very same time, however, governing terror also signals the degree to which western policies, local and global, are themselves also determined by a widespread fear of terror. This radical ambiguity—western societies themselves governed by terror in the process of trying to bring terror within the orbit of their political rationalities and governmental technologies—calls for a continuous double reading of terror. It also betrays a profound suspicion that the more effort that is put into governing terror, the more terror comes to govern the governors.

In certain respects, this is not a new thesis. Geopolitical analysts regularly note the danger of being dominated practically as well as psychologically by the strategies of one's enemies. I wish to state the thesis quite differently, because I think the reasons for it are as much biopolitical as they are geopolitical. We do not fully appreciate the extent to which liberal societies are themselves governed and seek to govern globally through what, in the process of interrogating the mechanisms by which the basic biological features of the human species became the object of its political strategization, Michel Foucault called biopower. We do not widely understand the kinds of imperatives to which the biopower of biopolitics now orders the political rationalities and governmental technologies of the west. Neither is it widely appreciated to what extent, and how, western biopolitics simply is a dispositif de sécurité: a dispositif that itself also came to revolve around a kind of low intensity but all-pervasive terror of contingency long before the contingency of global terror entered the scene. Thus it is that the contingency of global terror resonates powerfully with the terror of global contingency to engender a dangerous hyperbolicization of security and fear in the west that widely amplifies as it circulates and responds to that posed by the threat of Islamisist terror.

**War on terror is an extension of bio-political violence**

**Dillon** University of Lancaster **2007** Michael International Political Sociology wiley

By security, Foucault did not mean a universal value, or condition of possibility, for a political subject. He meant a certain set of mechanisms through which species life is regulated. Moreover, this set of mechanisms is itself governed by certain key analytical categories foremost among which is contingency. For the moment, the statement of my thesis is simply put: the war against terror emerged out of a generic biopolitics of contingency in the west, and is being conducted according to its political technologies and governmental rationalities, as much as it was precipitated by a contingent terroristic event directed against the epicenter of geopolitical hegemony in the United States. The biopolitical processes involved have been underway for some very considerable time. They were not initiated by the attacks on New York and Washington in September 2001. These attacks were driven by a complex of geopolitical factors both local and global. But those attacks also amplified and intensified a generative principle of formation that has long governed the biopoliticized security technologies of the west. That generative principle of formation is contingency itself. And it is here that the radical ambiguity of my title emerges most powerfully. What most characterizes global terror, we are persistently told, is the very certainty of its radical uncertainty. We do not know when terrorists may strike, we do not know how they will strike, and we do not know with what terrifying effect they will strike. We only know for sure that they will strike. It is the very contingency of terror that distinguishes its operational practice.1 But contingency is also the very operational heart of the security dispositif of the biopolitics of security as well.

# Answers to: Permutation

**Reject their spin about the aff complementing the alt—they prefigured the debate to occur on liberal terms—if we can’t contest ideological framing then alternative orientations are impossible**

**Knox 12** [Robert, PhD Candidate, London School of Economics and Political Science, paper presented at the Fourth Annual Conference of the Toronto Group for the Study of International, Transnational and Comparative Law and the Towards a Radical International Law workshop, “Strategy and Tactics”]

This warning is of great relevance to the type of ‘strategic’ interventions advocated by the authors. there are serious perils involved in making any intervention in liberal-legalist terms for critical scholars. the first is that – as per their own analysis – liberal legalism is not a neutral ground, but one which is likely to favour certain claims and positions. Consequently, it will be incredibly difficult to win the argument. Moreover, even if the argument is won, the victory is likely to be a very particular one – inasmuch as it will foreclose any wider consideration of the structural or systemic causes of any particular ‘violation’ of the law. All of these issues are to some degree considered by the authors.44 However, given the way in which ‘strategy’ is understood, the effects of these issues are generally confined to the immediate, conjunctural context. As such, the emphasis was placed upon the way that the language of liberal legalism blocked effective action and criticism of the war.45 Much less consideration is placed on the way in which advancing such argument impacts upon the long term effectiveness of achieving the strategic goals outlined above. Here, the problems become even more widespread. Choosing to couch the intervention in liberal legal terms ultimately reinforces the structure of liberal legalism, rendering it more difficult to transcend these arguments.46 In the best case scenario that such an intervention is victorious, this victory would precisely seem to underscore the liberal position on international law. Given that international law is in fact bound up with processes of exploitation and domination on a global scale, such a victory contributes to the legitimation of this system, making it very difficult to argue against its logic. this process takes place in three ways. Firstly, by intervening in the debate on its own terms, critical scholars reinforce those very terms, as their political goals are incorporated into it.47 It can then be argued the law is in fact neutral, because it is able to encompass such a wide variety of viewpoints. Secondly, in discarding their critical tools in order to make a public intervention, these scholars abandon their structural critique at the very moment when they should hold to it most strongly. that is to say, that at the point where there is actually a space to publicise their position, they choose instead to cleave to liberal legalism. thus, even if, in the ‘purely academic’ context, they continue to adhere to a ‘critical’ position, in public political terms, they advocate liberal legalism. Finally, from a purely ‘personal’ standpoint, in advocating such a position, they undercut their ability to articulate a critique in the future, precisely because they will be contradicting a position that they have already taken. the second point becomes increasingly problematic absent a guide for when it is that liberal legalism should be used and when it should not. Although the ‘embrace’ of liberal legalism is always described as ‘temporary’ or ‘strategic’, there is actually very little discussion about the specific conditions in which it is prudent to adopt the language of liberal legalism. It is simply noted at various points that this will be determined by the ‘context’.48 As is often the case, the term ‘context’ is invoked49 without specifying precisely which contexts are those that would necessitate intervening in liberal legal terms. Traditionally, such a context would be provided by a strategic understanding. that is to say, that the specific tactics to be undertaken in a given conjunctural engagement would be understood by reference to the larger structural aim. But here, there are simply no considerations of this. It seems likely therefore, that again context is understood in purely tactical terms. Martti Koskenniemi can be seen as representative in this respect, when he argued: What works as a professional argument depends on the circumstances. I like to think of the choice lawyers are faced with as being not one of method (in the sense of external, determinate guidelines about legal certainty) but of language or, perhaps better, of style. the various styles – including the styles of ‘academic theory’ and ‘professional practice’ – are neither derived from nor stand in determinate hierarchical relationships to each other. the final arbiter of what works is nothing other than the context (academic or professional) in which one argues.50 On this reading, the ‘context’ in which prudence operates seems to the immediate circumstances in which an intervention takes place. this would be consistent with the idea, expressed by the authors, that the ‘strategic’ context for adopting liberal legalism was that the debate was conducted in these terms. But the problem with this understanding is surely evident. As critical scholars have shown time and time again, the contemporary world is one that is deeply saturated with, and partly constituted by, juridical relations.51 Accordingly, there are really very few contexts (indeed perhaps none) in which political debate is not conducted in juridical terms. A brief perusal of world events would bear this out.52 the logical conclusion of this would seem to be that in terms of abstract, immediate effectiveness, the ‘context’ of public debate will almost always call for an intervention that is couched in liberal legalist terms. This raises a final vital question about what exactly distinguishes critical scholars from liberal scholars. If the above analysis holds true, then the ‘strategic’ interventions of critical scholars in legal and political debates will almost always take the form of arguing these debates in their own terms, and simply picking the ‘left’ side. thus, whilst their academic and theoretical writings and interventions may (or may not) retain the basic critical tools, the public political interventions will basically be ‘liberal’. The question then becomes, in what sense can we really characterise such interventions (and indeed such scholars) as ‘critical’? The practical consequence of understanding ‘strategy’ in essentially tactical terms seems to mean always struggling within the coordinates of the existing order. Given the exclusion of strategic concerns as they have been traditionally understood, there is no practical account for how these coordinates will ever be transcended (or how the debate will be reconfigured). As such, we have a group of people struggling within liberalism, on liberal terms, who may or may not also have some ‘critical’ understandings which are never actualised in public interventions. We might ask then, apart from ‘good intentions’ (although liberals presumably have these as well) what differentiates these scholars from liberals? Because of course liberals too can sincerely believe in political causes that are ‘of the left’. It seems therefore, that just as – in practical terms – strategic essentialism collapses into essentialism, so too does ‘strategic’ liberal legalism collapse into plain old liberal legalism.53

# Impact – Reject politic of fear - corrupt

**Even if 1ac threats are real, unintended consequences and corrupt scholarship are reasons to vote neg on presumption**

Pieterse 7 [Jan Nederveen, professor of sociology at the University of Illinois, Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 14, No. 3, Aug., “Political and Economic Brinkmanship,” p. 473-4]

Brinkmanship and producing instability carry several meanings. The American military spends 48% of world military spending (2005) and rep resents a vast, virtually continuously growing establishment that is a world in itself with its own lingo, its own reasons, internecine battles and projects. That this large security establishment is a bipartisan project makes it politically relatively immune. That for security reasons it is an insular world shelters it from scrutiny. For reasons of 'deniability' the president is insulated from certain operations (Risen, 2006). That it is a completely hierarchical world onto itself makes it relatively unaccountable. Hence, to quote 'stuff happens'. In part this is the familiar theme of the Praetorian Guard and the shadow state (Stockwell, 1991). It includes a military on the go, a military that seeks career advancement through role expansion, seeks expansion through threat inflation, and in inflated threats finds rationales for ruthless action and is thus subject to feedback from its own echo chambers. Misinformation broadcast by part of the intelligence apparatus blows back to other security circles where it may be taken for real (Johnson, 2000). Inhabiting a hall of mirrors this apparatus operates in a perpetual state of self hypnosis with, since it concerns classified information and covert ops, limited checks on its functioning. The military stages phirric victories that come at a price of lasting instability. In Afghanistan the US staged a swift settlement by backing and funding the Northern Alliance, which brought warlords and drug lords to power and a corrupt power structure that eventually precipitated the comeback of the Taliban. In Iraq the US backed the Kurds and permitted Shiite militias to operate (until the Samarra bombing of April 2006) and thus created conditions for lasting instability. The American rules of engagement are self-serving. But because the military inhabits a parallel universe and the media are clogged with 'defense experts', discussion of these tactics and hence the capacity for self-correction is limited. Part of the backdrop is the trend of the gradual erosion of state capacities because of 25 years, since the Reagan era, of cutting government services except the military and security. The laissez-faire state in the US has created an imbalance in which the military remains the major growing state capability, which leaves military power increasingly unchecked because monitoring institutions have been downsized or dismantled too. When recently the Pentagon wanted to review all the subcontracts it has outsourced this task was outsourced too. This redistribution of power within the US government played a key part leading up to the war and in the massive failure in Iraq. Diplomacy was under resourced, intelligence was manipulated and the Pentagon and the Office of Strategic Planning ignored experts' advice and State Department warnings on the need for postwar planning (Packer, 2005; Lang, 2004).

# Impact – Value to Life Outweighs All

Our morality is certain anyway. The dangerous and unknown aspects of life are precisely those that make it worth living. Taking risks highlights the difference between life and death by defying morality for the sake of curiosity.

Phillips, 1998 (Anita. Editor of British Journal of interstice. A Defence of Masochism. Pa 151-154.

“the masochist cannot be broken from the outside. Every endurance of pain, humiliation or suffering only goes to increase the resilience.

Their fervour means that those people who could be identified as masochistic tend to be imaginative risk-takers, people who need to know what it is like in the world outside. Another way of putting this might be that being intensely sexual by definition (as masochism implies) also means displaying strong levels of curiosity. The desire is not for mastery of the world or for the power in it, but for enveloping, taking in the external, especially its unknowns and unfamiliar aspects. This voluptuous curiosity looks for fresh encounters, and is unlikely to be satisfied with the kid of knowledge that can be gained through culture. The transgressive need of the masochist makes risk taking and direct exposure to the unknown and important part of his or her life.”

# Impact – Politics of Fear is War

**Securitization is war by other means**

**Dillon** Prof of Politics at Lancaster **2008** Michael Foucault on Politics, Security and War page 176-177

If Foucault is right, that liberal peace is the extension of war by other means, then those other means come in the form of the prevalence of security discourses. Peace becomes the extension of war through the discourse of security. [Foucault cryptically notes how liberal biopolitics is a dispositif de securite (Foucault, 2007: p. 91). Its very arts of governance revolve around the securing of life as species existence.] Here is how and why.

Whatever endangers the promotion of species life endangers liberal biopolitics. The peace for which liberal biopolitics strives is that of the uninterrupted promotion of species existence. Such a peace is endangered when it is challenged by other accounts of existence and by the sheer intractability of species existence itself. Liberal biopolitics makes war on that which endangers species existence through the discursive practices which seeks to secure the promotion of species existence. Peace and war find their biopolitical articulation in the biopolitical discourses of security (Dillon and Reid, 2008).

In sum, making life live ostensibly rejects war as a virtue and proclaims peace. The vocation of war is to kill. The vocation of biopolitics is 'to make live'. But biopolitics cannot make live unless it preserves life from that which threatens it. To do that biopolitics must also seek a command of a refigured death, specifically that of biopoliticised economy of who shall live and who shall die. Although he acknowledges it, Foucault does not reflect on this necropoli tics beyond the observations he made about the state racism of Nazi Germany and the incipient racism of state socialism. My additional argument is that it is their apparatuses of security which, therefore, do the biopolitical work of inscribing the logos of peace with the logos of war. Liberal peace is a necropolitics of security which makes permanent war against life on behalf of life.

Making life live is therefore a lethal business because the promotion of species existence appears to be threatened on all sides, not only by alternative accounts of existence, but also by the danger which species existence always seems to pose to itself not least in often being resistant to the biopolitical injunction to make life live. For not all life can live if life itself is to be promoted. Some life is inimical to life and has to be exterminated if it cannot be corrected and reformed. Life is like that. To be precise species life is like that and so we have to clarify this basic classification of what it is to be a living being because it is foundational to biopolitics and how, as such, it has need of the sub-division of species life into more or less functionally utile categories of human life to which the term race applies.

# Impact – Biopolitics Bad

**Biopolitical governmentality engages in a technological framing of the social which sacrifices life in the name of saving populations**

**Dillon** University of Lancaster **2007** Michael International Political Sociology wiley

Ultimately what is therefore at stake in biopoliticized accounts of life is the account being given of life itself, and of what it is to be a life (Deleuze 1995; Agamben 1999). If you wish to contest biopolitics, you cannot do so simply by taking issue with its distributive economy, geopolitical alliances, imperializing practices or murderous promotion of reproductively developmental life planet-wide; "they will either succeed in changing our way of life, or we will succeed in changing theirs" (Rumsfeldt 2006). Ultimately, you are not only forced to contest at the level of what it is to be a living thing in particular, this living thing hitherto called Anthropos or Man. Political modernity's very anthropocentrism, of which liberal biopolitics is a revised hegemonic expression, is itself now brought into question by the many ways in which its very digital and molecular revolutions have transformed what it is to be a living thing in ways some call posthuman and postvital (Hayles 1999; Doyle 2004). There, nonetheless, in the living thing that is now thinking itself beyond itself in these ways, that newly writes, speaks and kills at will as well as on command—because Brecht says it is not given to it not to kill—there nonetheless always seems more to life than meets the molecular biopolitics of contemporary biopower, just as there was always more to the human than meets the phallo-logo anthropocentric Man.4

As Foucault noted, the biopolitics of security wager the life of the species on their own biopolitical strategies. What biopolitics of security therefore amplify in addition is how, wagering the life of the species on biopoliticizing security strategies, and in the very process of biopolitically technologizing life in the cause of its auto-governance, the speciated existence of biopolitical enframing finally calls itself into question if life—whatever it is—is not to be extinguished in the name of life.

Thus, as the vital signs of life have changed so also has what a living thing is taken to be. In the process, foundational distinctions between the organic and the inorganic, life and not life, animate and inanimate, no longer hold in the ways that they once did. Reframing inanimate material in terms of code, for example, incorporates it within the now legendary lifelike capabilities of informational systems. Thus, under the regime of information, it increasingly seems as if life ought to be redefined biopolitically as animation.

The implications for security politics, in particular those liberal biopolitical security discourses and practices that take life as their referent object of security, could not be more profound. The very thing that it takes as its principle of formation, life itself, becomes inoperable as what it is to be a living thing mutates in such a way that it no longer makes much sense to even pose such a question: since life-like properties can be installed in all systems by codified design, while the lifelike properties of existing systems may be nullified and redesigned by virtue of the same technical capability. Rather than mere protection, security becomes a positive life science preoccupied with experiment and design in the fashioning of resilient self-immunizing bodies. Such changes also provide additional reasons as to why contingency is so central now to the new liberal biopolitics of security, and why the very reason of contingency invokes novel forms of mathematics and synthetic sciences of combination in addition to risk and probability analysis. All of these are central to how The Long War that now incorporates the War on Terror into a war without end on behalf of life simultaneously governs through, as it is governed by the contingency of terror that exemplifies, precisely because it continuously threatens to purely operationalize in world-destructive form, the terror of contingency. Terror piles on terror here for liberal biopolitics of security as the very principle around which it revolves emergent life itself becomes inoperable as it becomes capable of negating itself.

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# Impact – BioP Root Cause of War

**Bio-power is the root cause of war and violence**

**Dillon & Reid 2001** (Michael and Julian, Michael Dillon is Professor of Politics in the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Lancaster and Julian Reid is a Doctoral Student in the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Lancaster , Global Liberal Governance: Biopolitics, Security, and War, 2001Millennium - Journal of International Studies, pp.39-40)

For capitalist society biopolitics is what is most important, the biological, the somatic, the corporeal.1 [U]ltimately what presides over all these mechanisms is not the unitary functioning of an apparatus or an institution, but the necessity of combat and the rules of strategy…In this central and centralised humanity…we must hear the distant roar of battle.2 Intimately allied with the globalisation of capital, but not entirely to be conflated with it, has emerged a new and diverse ensemble of power known as global liberal governance. This term of art refers to a varied and complex regime of power, whose founding principle lies in the administration and production of life, rather than in threatening death. Global liberal governance is substantially comprised of techniques that examine the detailed properties and dynamics of populations so that they can be better managed with respect to their many needs and life chances. In this great plural and complex enterprise, global liberal governance marks a considerable intensification and extension, via liberal forms o f power, of what Michel Foucault called the ‘great economy o f power’ whose principles of formation were sought from the eighteenth century onwards, once ‘the problem of the accumulation and useful administration of men first emerged’.3 Foucault called this kind of power—the kind of power/knowledge that seeks to foster and promote life rather than the juridical sovereign kind of po wer that threatens death— biopower, and its politics biopolitics. This paper forms part of our continuing exploration of the diverse character of global liberal governance as a form of global biopolitics.4 We are concerned, like Foucault, to draw attention to the peculiar ways in which biopower deploys force and violence, not least because biopower hides its violent face and, ‘gives to the power to inflict legal punishment a context in which it appears to be free of all excess and violence’.5 Second, we draw attention, as Foucault consistently does, to the ways in which global biopolitics operates as a strategic game in which the principle of war is assimilated into the very weft and warp of the socio -economic and cultural net works of bio political relations. Here Foucault reverses the old Clausewitzean adage concerning the relation between politics and war. Biopolitics is the pursuit of war b y other means. We are also concerned, however, to note how the conceptualisation and practice of war itself changes via the very process of its assimilation into, and dialogical relation with, the heart of biopolitical order; and we concentrate on that point in this essay. There is, in addition, a further way in which we seek to extend Foucault’s project.

# Impact – BioP =s Extinction

**Bio-power’s obsession with survival guarantees extinction**

**Kouros 1997** (George, Yale Law Graduate, And Holds a B.A. in Philosophy from Emory. “Become What You Are”)

Although the consequences are grave, the administrative practices of biopower go largely unchallenged precisely because they promise the opportunity of vastly improving the quality of life. But a system primarily concerned with technological exigencies of ensuring survival paradoxically is no longer able to assign meaning to the value of life. Life is something to be secured at all costs, and by any means, as the American military motto of "you have to kill to save" during the Vietnam War demonstrates. For Foucault, this technological imperative to secure survival is what brings us closest to the possibility of our own extinction: [T]his formidable power of death ... now presents itself as the counterpart of a power that exerts a positive influence on life, that endeavors to administer, optimize, and multiply it, subjecting it to precise controls and comprehensive regulations. Wars ... are waged on behalf of the existence of everyone; entire populations are mobilized for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name of life necessity: massacres have become vital. It is as managers of life and survival, of bodies and the race, that so many regimes have been able to wage so many wars, causing so many men to be killed. And through a turn that closes the circle, as the technology of wars has caused them to tend increasingly toward all-out destruction, the decision that initiates them and the one that terminates them are in fact increasingly informed by the naked question of survival. The atomic situation is now at the end point of this process: the power to expose a whole population to death is the underside of the power to guarantee an individual's existence . . . If genocide is indeed the dream of modern powers, this is not because of a recent return of the ancient right to kill; it is because power is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race. (HS 137) In the interest of optimizing life we find ourselves possessing the capabilities to wipe out all of humanity as we know it. Heidegger, much like Foucault, understands "the atomic situation" as the product of a technological process that seeks to create "a happier human life."8 But he also emphasizes that "precisely if the hydrogen bombs do not explode and human life on earth is preserved" that we face the greatest danger (DT 52). Responding to a chemist's proclamation that "The hour is near when life will be placed in the hands of the chemist who will be able to synthesize, split and change living substance at will," Heidegger writes: "We do not stop to consider that an attack with technological means is being prepared upon the life and nature of man compared with which the explosion of the hydrogen bomb means little" (DT 52). In other words, in the absence of a nuclear holocaust we assume that we have managed to keep technology in hand. Without the sound of an explosion to alert us, we become complacent to the deadliness of our own technological achievements. For example, the chemist's ability to manipulate DNA and genetically screen out undesirable traits, while promising the possibility of a "happier human being," maintains the conditions for a eugenic nightmare.

# Alternative – Politics of dissent

**The alternative’s politics of dissent channels progressive politics towards massive collective struggle --- try or die for challenging corporate technocracy**

**Giroux 14** [Henry A., Global TV Network Chair Professor at McMaster University in the English and Cultural Studies Department and a Distinguished Visiting Professor at Ryerson University, “Totalitarian Paranoia in the Post-Orwellian Surveillance State,” Truthout, 10 February 2014, <http://www.truth-out.org/opinion/item/21656-totalitarian-paranoia-in-the-post-orwellian-surveillance-state>]

Under the rubric of battling terrorism, the US government has waged a war on civil liberties, privacy and democracy while turning a blind eye to the ways in which the police and intelligence agencies infiltrate and harass groups engaged in peaceful protests, particularly treating those groups denouncing banking and corporate institutions as criminal activities.73 They also have done nothing to restrict those corporate interests that turn a profit by selling arms, promoting war and investing surveillance apparatuses addicted to the mad violence of the war industries. Unfortunately, such legal illegalities and death-oriented policies are not an Orwellian fiction but an advancement of the world Orwell prematurely described regarding surveillance and its integration with totalitarian regimes. The existence of the post-Orwellian state, where subjects participate willingly and surveillance connects to global state and corporate sovereignty, should muster collective outrage among the American public and generate massive individual resistance and collective struggles aimed at the development of social movements designed to take back democracy from the corporate-political-military extremists that now control all the commanding institutions of American society. Putting trust in a government that makes a mockery of civil liberties is comparable to throwing away the most basic principles of our constitutional and democratic order. As Johnathan Schell argues:

Government officials, it is true, assure us that they will never pull the edges of the net tight. They tell us that although they could know everything about us, they won't decide to. They'll let the information sit unexamined in the electronic vaults. But history, whether of our country or others, teaches that only a fool would place faith in such assurances. What one president refrains from doing the next will do; what is left undone in peacetime is done when a crisis comes.74

History offers alternative narratives to those supported by the new authoritarians. Dangerous counter-memories have a way of surfacing unexpectedly at times and, in doing so, can challenge to the normalization of various forms of tyranny, including the mechanisms of a surveillance state defined by a history of illegal and criminal behavior. As the mainstream press recently noted, the dark shadow of Orwell's dystopian fable was so frightening in the early 1970s that a group of young people broke into an FBI office in Media, Pennsylvania, stole as many records as possible, and leaked them to the press. None of the group was ever caught.75 Their actions were not only deeply rooted in an era when dissent against the Vietnam war, racism and corporate corruption was running high but also was suggestive of an era in which the politics of fear was not a general condition of society and large groups of people were mobilizing in numerous sites to make power accountable on a number of fronts, extending from college campuses to the shaping of foreign policy. The 1971 burglary made clear that the FBI was engaging in illegal and criminal acts aimed primarily against anti-war dissenters and the African-American community, which was giving voice in some cities to the Black Power movement.

What the American people learned as a result of the leaked FBI documents was that many people were being illegally tapped, bugged, and that anti-war groups were being infiltrated. Moreover, the leaked files revealed that the FBI was spying on Martin Luther King Jr. and a number of other prominent politicians and activists. A couple of years later Carl Stern, an NBC reporter, followed up on the information that had been leaked and revealed a program called COINTELPRO, which stands for Counterintelligence Program, that documented how the FBI and CIA not only were secretly harassing, disrupting, infiltrating and neutralizing leftist organizations but also were attempting to assassinate those considered domestic and foreign enemies.76 COINTELPRO was about more than spying, it was an illegally sanctioned machinery of violence and assassination.77 In one of the most notorious cases, the FBI worked with the Chicago Police to set up the conditions for the assassination of Fred Hampton and Mark Clark, two members of the Black Panther Party. Noam Chomsky has called COINTELPRO, which went on from the 1950s to the '70s, when it was stopped, "the worst systematic and extended violation of basic civil rights by the federal government," and "compares with Wilson's Red Scare."78 As a result of these revelations, Sen. Frank Church conducted Senate hearings that exposed the illegalities the FBI was engaged in and helped to put in place polices that provided oversight to prevent such illegalities from happening again. Needless to say, over time these oversights and restrictions were dismantled, especially after the tragic events of 9/11.

What these young people were doing in 1971 is not unlike what Snowden and other whistle-blowers are doing today by making sure that dissent is not suppressed by governments who believe that power should reside only in the hands of government and financial elites and that all attempts to make authoritarian power accountable should be repressed at almost any cost. Many of these young protesters were influenced by the ongoing struggles of the civil rights movement and one of them, John Raines, was heavily influenced by the theologian Dietrich Bonhoeffer, who was killed by the Nazis. What is crucial about this incident is that it not only revealed the long historical reach of government surveillance and criminal activity designed to squash dissent, it also provides a model of civic courage by young people who acted on their principles in a nonviolent way to stop what they considered to be machineries of civil and social death. As Greenwald argues, COINTELPRO makes clear that governments have no qualms about "targeting citizens for their disfavored political views and trying to turn them into criminals through infiltration, entrapment and the like" and that such actions are "alive and well today in the United States."79 Governments that elevate lawlessness to one of the highest principles of social order reproduce and legitimate violence as an acceptable mode of action throughout a society. Violence in American society has become its heartbeat and nervous system, paralyzing ideology, policy and governance, if not the very idea of politics. Under such circumstances, the corporate and surveillance state become symptomatic of a form of tyranny and authoritarianism that has corrupted and disavowed the ideals and reality of a substantive democracy.

Dissent is crucial to any viable notion of democracy and provides a powerful counterforce to the dystopian imagination that has descended like a plague on American society; but dissent is not enough. In a time of surging authoritarianism, it is crucial for everyone to find the courage to translate critique into the building of popular movements dedicated to making education central to any viable notion of politics. This is a politics that does the difficult work of assembling critical formative cultures by developing alternative media, educational organizations, cultural apparatuses, infrastructures and new sites through which to address the range of injustices plaguing the United States and the forces that reproduce them. The rise of cultures of surveillance along with the defunding of public and higher education, the attack on the welfare state and the militarization of everyday life can be addressed in ways that not only allow people to see how such issues are interrelated to casino capitalism and the racial-security state but also what it might mean to make such issues meaningful to make them critical and transformative. As Charlie Derber has written, "How to express possibilities and convey them authentically and persuasively seems crucially important" if any viable notion of resistance is to take place.80

Nothing will change unless the left and progressives take seriously the subjective underpinnings of oppression in the United States. The power of the imagination, dissent, and the willingness to hold power accountable constitute a major threat to authoritarian regimes. Snowden's disclosures made clear that the authoritarian state is deeply fearful of those intellectuals, critics, journalists and others who dare to question authority, expose the crimes of corrupt politicians and question the carcinogenic nature of a corporate state that has hijacked democracy: This is most evident in the insults and patriotic gore heaped on Manning and Snowden.

# Alternative – Reject your Truth Claims

**Simple policy discussion is not sufficient to end oppressive policies. Critical discourse against the discourse of security professionals is necessary in contesting ideologically accepted norms and practices.**

**Bigo 2002** (Didier, Professor of International Relations at Sciences-Po, Paris, “Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease”)

**Some "critical" discourses generated by NGOs and academics assume that if people, politicians, governments, bureaucracies, and journalists were more aware, they would change their minds about migration and begin to resist securitizing it. The primary problem, therefore, is ideological or discursive in that the securitization of migrants derives from the language itself and from the different capacities of various actors to engage in speech acts. In this context, the term "speech act" is used not in its technical Austiniansense, but metaphorically, to justify both the normative position of a speaker and the value of their critical discourse against the discourses of the security professionals. This understanding of critique reinforces the vision of a contest between ideas and norms, a contest in which academics can play a leading role.**

**Effective challenges can only be indirect by analyzing the conditions under which the authority of truth is given to a discourse**

**Bigo 2002** (Didier, Professor of International Relations at Sciences-Po, Paris, “Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease”)

As Ayse Ceyhan and Anastasia Tsoukala show in this issue**, claims that increases in insecurity can be attributed to the responsibility of migrants for crime, delinquency, and deviance have been successfully challenged by critical analysis without much effect on the prevailing political rhetoric. Analytical accuracy has not really undermined the consensus among political leaders and bureaucracies. It is not directly by arguing for migrants and against securitization that critical discourses can change the situation.15 Details of the negative effects of government policies or international institutions will not change the situation for immigrants. They will still be framed in relation to statist practices of rejection or integration. Effective challenges can only be indirect, by analyzing the conditions under which the authority of truth is given to a discourse that creates the immigrant as an "outsider, inside the State."**

# Alternative – Reject your Truth Claims

**Framework answer-The state justifies itself as the only political order possible when sovereignty is accepted as a prerequisite for peace and homogeneity.**

**Bigo 2002** (Didier, Professor of International Relations at Sciences-Po, Paris, “Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease”)

The genealogy of the Western state, in relation to both its strongest myths and its institutionalization, has been analyzed in the sociologies of Pierre Bourdieu and Anthony Giddens.19 They have shown how, in Bourdieu's terms, "states conceptualise us more than we, as academics, conceptualise the State." The studies in international-relations theory by John Ruggie, Thomas Biersteker, Richard Ashley, and R. B. J. Walker have similarly emphasized the capacity of states to impose themselves as a frame of mind.20 They obliged IR theorists to analyze the territorial dimensionl of the Westphalian state, a topic that has also been examined by Bertrand Badie, Richard Mansbach, and Martin Heisler.21 I will not develop this aspect here: **I just want to emphasize that, even if all these concepts were arms in symbolic and political struggles between different groups, the concepts of sovereignty, security, and borders always structure our thought as if there existed a "body"— an "envelope," or "container"—differentiating one polity from another. The state justifies itself as the only political order possible as soon as it is accepted that sovereignty, law and order, and a single body are the prerequisite for peace and homogeneity. It justifies the "national" identity that the state has achieved through a territorialization of its order, by a cutting up of borders.**

# Alternative – Reject your Truth Claims

**Biased information expressed by politicians structure their space, their way of thinking and acting concerning a "political problem**

**Bigo 2002** (Didier, Professor of International Relations at Sciences-Po, Paris, “Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease”)

Neither Edelman nor Rogin adequately examines a further dynamic, one that Paul Veyne has developed in another context—**a dynamic arising from the ways in which politicians believe in their own myths, even if they consciously and cynically activate them themselves. They are not mystificators and jokers. Despite the differences expressed in and generated by political struggles, national traditions, professional interests, and the cynicisms apparent in the leadership of police or defense ministries, politicians live in the myths about polity, sovereignty, and state. They participate in this illusion of the political field. These myths structure their space, their way of thinking and acting concerning a "political problem," and explain to some degree the homogeneity of their reaction to the "immigration problem" in the diversity of Western states.**

# Alternative – Reject your Truth Claims

**Framework/metaphor of speaking about the state good**

**Bigo 2002** (Didier, Professor of International Relations at Sciences-Po, Paris, “Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease”)

**This does not mean that politicians necessarily *believe* in the myths they disseminate regarding immigrants, or Islamists, or border transgression: they know the limits of their "fable" as well as the**

**Greeks knew that their gods were part of the fairy tale.26 Nonetheless, they cannot call into question those myths about state, about the integrity of the people, because the myths are the way they frame their everyday explanation of the political and social world and the way they see their own struggles and values. Even the most cynical among them do not have another framework in which to speak about the state and security. This is why the metaphor of the penetration of something foreign into a body is so powerful, even if national trajectories modify the framing of this use so that, for example, the arrival of migrants is expressed as a tidal wave (as in Britain), a hole in the Dutch dikes, or a barbarian invasion (as in France).**

**Framework turn-Professional political discourse seek to control both the discourse and the debate space.**

**Bigo 2002** (Didier, Professor of International Relations at Sciences-Po, Paris, “Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease”)

**These figures of discourse concerning immigration as a "penetration" are created by the professionals of politics and based on a central presupposition made by politicians about their own capacity of governance in relation to the state: the presupposition that it is possible to control the flow of individuals at the borders of them state.28 It assumes that professional politicians have a power that they do not want to lose concerning their right to accept or to refuse the everyday movement of people from other countries. This assumption is now even more important for them given that they know they have less and less importance in decision making concerning money and credit.29 It implies, in mind of the politician, the possibility of managing in practice, through law and its implementation, the freedom of circulation of individuals over whom the politicians consider they have a right of control if necessary.30 Consequently, when these discourses and myths of the professionals of politics are confronted with the social practices of transborder activities, and the impossibility of managing millions of decisions taken by individuals, they conflict with the security professionals who are in charge of effectively controlling the borders—who yet know that, practically speaking, they cannot seal the frontiers.**

# Alternative – Reject your Truth Claims

**Debates merely about the question of policy are insufficient as they never analyze discursive formation of norms and rules.**

**Bigo 2002** (Didier, Professor of International Relations at Sciences-Po, Paris, “Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease”)

**Migration is seen as a political problem because it enters into the political arena in a way that contests the premises of polity and state. Immigration is always seen as problematic, a problem that cannot be solved by law making. For some, it is a problem that might be solved through compromise and a clear view of national interests in which migrants could be an asset for the "receiving country." For others, coming from the particular point of view of the security professionals, especially the intelligence service and the military, migrants are not a political dilemma but a national security problem.34 From this perspective, migrants were a problem in the past and they continue to be an insidious danger: the term *immigrant* is politically meaningful only in a discourse of "struggle against illegal immigrants," or in a discourse of "regulation," but in any case in a rhetoric of cultural nationalism creating citizenship by difference with these outsiders inside the state.35 Often, the discourses "against" securitization (such as speaking of Fortress Europe or criticizing the immigration/invasion metaphors) themselves use the basic presuppositions of the discourses they criticize (sovereignty, state, body politic). They contest the content but rarely the formulation of questions—and almost never on the basis of an analysis of discursive formation rules, even though it is there that the security process draws part of its symbolic strength.36**

**Traditional discourses on migration prioritize state and expert discourse in security policy.**

**Bigo 2002** (Didier, Professor of International Relations at Sciences-Po, Paris, “Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease”)

The Europeanization of politics has created new fora in which different politicians (whether from Right or Left) map out a program on "law-and-order reestablishment" on behalf of the control of migratory flows (in order either to exclude or for better integration) but to safeguard their idea of their own power**. These politicians always ask (with some success at the electoral level) for more controls, more monitoring, more private participation from business and citizens in order to consolidate a security threatened at the borders and at home. They mobilize security agencies of ever greater scope, call for help from citizens, and build a fantasy figure of an internal-security state (participative through vigilantism, police-made, with a proactive surveillance dimension, and punitive with its penal sprawl) whose monitoring powers have never been so mighty since the state was declared to be weakening. 37 And yet this is a state that they are completely unable to implement in the program they propose.38 Security is here considered by the more traditional groups as the peak of a political problem where "exceptional measures," "measures beyond law," need to be taken. Thus the security process itself is the result of mobilization of the work of political discourses and of practices of security agencies based on the argument of danger and emergency. Many studies of security forget this primary work of political mobilization leading to securitization. They reproduce at the analytical level the discourses of the "hard-liners" or security professionals.39 They analyze security as being a different realm from politics, or as being "a particular type of politics applicable to a wide range of issues."40 They consider that security is like a "sphere" placed under the responsibility of the army and other experts on security, a sphere that is the mirror of existential threats concerning survival but that could come eventually from separate sectors.41 By so doing, they validate the view of the security professionals that security is an "explanation" of the security process and not a discourse to be challenged.**

# Alternative – Reject your Truth Claims

**Framework-Anxiety over normative discourses in the debate space is necessary as the state seeks to obtain the capacity of a stable sovereign.**

**Bigo 2002** (Didier, Professor of International Relations at Sciences-Po, Paris, “Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease”)

The notion of *habitus* is very suggestive in this context. It helps to make sense of this way of anticipating time through morphing technologies as a way of anticipating the movement of targeted groups in space, as well as the evolution of their behavior, together with the possibility of managing a "stock exchange" of fears at the transnational level while maintaining secrecy from outsiders. This habitus brings together all the members of services as diverse as customs, police, intelligence services, bankers engaged in risk assessment, and suppliers of new technologies of surveillance. They share a specific kind of the "sense of the game." They have an *illusion* in common. They believe and act/react in a similar way even if they are always in competition. **The security professionals have all become managers of unease. They have created considerable autonomy for their own field—the management of fear. They have succeeded in creating "security" as their object (rather than the object of national politicians). They have created security as the "legitimate" object of their discourses by investing manpower, time, statistical apparatus, and other routines that give shape to political labels. Moreover, this field of the security professionals is increasingly organized transnationally. It links different bureaucracies by specifying specific threats or risks that can be managed together: immigration to regulate, an environment to protect, a terrorism to fight, and in the end a population worried by the encircling barbarians and the idea of the decline of civilization. This internationalization is especially important for the European Union, where the professional managers of unease have created their own fora and networks, sometimes against their national politicians; in some domains, however, these networks also have a transatlantic dimension. Securitization, then, is generated through a confrontation between the strategies of political actors (or of actors having access to the political stage through the media), in the national political field, the security professionals at the transnational level (public and private bureaucracies managing the fear), and the global social transformations affecting the possibilities of reshaping political boundaries (by legitimizing, or not, the transformation of technologies of control and surveillance).**

**Alternative forms of education/performance good**

**Bigo 2002** (Didier, Professor of International Relations at Sciences-Po, Paris, “Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease”)

**At the same moment, some policemen invented at the EU level the notion of internal security so as to promote collaboration between police organizations and to include the surveillance of people crossing borders within the scope of policing against crime. Some military people, using their technologies for other purposes, invented a Southern threat against the West in order to include in their task the surveillance of people from abroad, together with their children if they live together in specific areas.55 As Pierre Bourdieu has shown, it is when beliefs and norms are transformed because of the inner struggles inside a field, and when creativity is important—even if creativity is simply a regression toward an established *habitus* and a rewriting of familiar stories using old grammars56—that it is possible to understand the autonomization of a field as such. This analysis of security shows that the merging of internal and external security has created the condition of possibility whereby the migrant is, par excellence, the object of securitization because it comes from both sides. The "security field" where policemen and gendarmes now meet secret service and military people and structure a new and wider conception of security is created by the focal point of the immigrant as a threat internally and externally. It is not that the space of the inside and the outside is changing, or that international security is extending inside through a "societal" sector; it is that they are now intertwined by the convergence toward the same figure of risk and of unease management, the immigrant.**

# Alternative – Reject your Truth Claims

**Interpretation Answer-Discussions of security politics should have different interpretations from politicians and professionals of unease in order to disrupt dominant forms of policy.**

**Bigo 2002** (Didier, Professor of International Relations at Sciences-Po, Paris, “Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease”)d

**Inventing different emancipation norms is also crucial, as commentators like Ken Booth and R. B. J. Walker have emphasized in different ways. Coproduction of security, necessary in the struggle against crime, should be disconnected from migratory issues and should be accompanied by a coproduction of freedoms and guarantees in order that the weak and the newcomers on a territory are not the quasi-exclusive targets of a policy against delinquency. Security should thus have another meaning independent from interest of the politicians and professionals of unease. Scholars cannot present themselves as spectators. Their analyses, including the most critical, are used by some actors of the social and political interplay. They participate, *nolens, volens,* in the production of the history of the securitization of immigration, when they are not describing the modification of agencies practices. A withdrawal into pure theory is not possible, but at the same moment, academics are not key actors in the process of (de) securitization.**

# Alternative – Reject your Truth Claims

**The challenge is to criticize these modalities of technology – the attempt to control populations is ultimately a plurality of technologies of the body which regulate political rationalities, knowledges and discourses. This power regime of truth encourages the violence which plagues the international system**

**Athanasiou,** Social Anthropologist at the University of Thessaly, **2003** Athena, differences: A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies 14.1, project muse

The challenge, following Foucault, is to rethink “technology” not as a singularly constituted and reified instrumentality, but rather as a plural, dispersed, and discontinuous engagement as it is enacted in the following registers: biopolitical technologies, whereby an archive of political rationalities, knowledges, discourses, and practices seek to govern both the individual human body and the welfare of population; technologies of the body, whereby at stake is not (or is not *only*) the memorable image **[End Page 144]** of Foucault’s publicly tortured “body of the condemned” in *Discipline and Punish*, but rather the management of the desiring body’s life and agency; and technologies of the self, which permit individuals to act upon themselves and constitute themselves as (intelligible) self-governing subjects. As Foucault has shown, what is technological about such modalities of technology is their performative ability to incite into discourse, to call forth desires and prohibitions, and to bring intelligible figurations of human subjectivity into being. As Ronell puts it, technology has produced man as subject and world as his object (217). The globalized political investment in subjects does not wipe out the modern histories of differentiated subjects as viable or disposable according to certain standards of intelligibility, including class, economic resources, gender, sexuality, race, and ethnicity. If there is anything “new” about the technoscience of Western postmodern biopolitics, it would be that it complicates, decentralizes, proliferates, and intensifies the differentiation of power involved in the definitions, images, fantasies, and representations of “humanity” and its thinkable demarcations. Paradoxically, biopolitical discipline tends thus to be less visible, more subtly dispersed and systematically integrated in the discreet banality of cultural fabric, despite the proliferation of electronic, virtual, digital, and other technologies of surveillance and visual media. This dispersion does not imply that contemporary biopolitics entails necessarily less authoritative violence, but rather that it involves a multitude of recognized and misrecognized techniques of violence through which the conditions of human intelligibility and livability are instituted and confirmed. In the horizon of post–cold war biopolitics, the conceptual and political distinctions between criminal and symbolic violence, welfare and warfare, as well as between fatality and legality, are brought into crisis.

It is in a “genealogical” mode that I look at the constitution of epistemes, identifications, discourses, disciplinary techniques, and power practices in the Europe of modernity and postmodernity, in the Europe of humanism, inhumanness, and posthumanity. By epitomizing critical variables of the modern facticity, such as transparency and self-evidence, quantitative formalization came to be indispensable to the emergence of national “population” in the European eighteenth century as a thematized object of scientific inquiry and administrative control, governmentalized through the phenomena of birth and death rates, life expectancy, fertility, patterns of hygiene and habitation. Made possible by the late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century epistemological emphasis on standardized quantification, the authority of referentially anchored calculative and [End Page 145] classificatory logic remains part of an imaginary in which numerical normalcy is a crucial characteristic of any nation-state worthy of the name.

The contemporary instances of obdurate enmity between the nation-state and its Others, whether insiders (disenfranchised ethnic, religious, or other “minorities”) or outsiders (demonized strangers or foes) ought to be viewed, I suggest, not as irrational expressions of innate primordial sentiments, but as political phenomena grounded in modern rational collective imaginations deeply concerned with—technologically mediated—biopolitical enumeration and ascription. Not only the highly mediatized explosion of ethnic conflicts in the “post-socialist” Balkans during the past decade (such as the recent shambles of Kosovo following Yugoslavia’s demise and the disastrous involvement of the international coalition of “the West”), but also the smaller-scale and anonymous “everyday crimes” of xenophobic animosities against guest-worker and immigrant populations in various European capitalist democracies expose the enduring logic of categorical objectification and taxonomic reification in the age of transnational time-space flexibility and unboundedness. The ethnonationalist politics of rape, the ethnic cleansing and bloodletting during the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but also the anti-immigration politics plaguing an increasingly if unevenly integrated “postnational” Europe are expressions and mutations, but not aberrations, of this powerful truth regime.

# Alternative – Reject your Truth Claims

**Resistance comes first – though many misread Foucault’s analysis of power as subordinating resistance to power, it is resistance which ontologically precedes power. Our act of resistance is necessary for the creation of a subject because it opens the possibility of resistance against the self.**

**Kelly** Lecturer in Philosophy at Middlesex University **2009** Mark The Political Philosophy of Michel Foucault p 119-123

Many have argued, however, presumably in ignorance of Foucault's remark that "resistance comes first," both critics and even several upholders of Foucault alike, that he makes resistance ontologically subsidiary to power. Now, this does not imply that we are trapped by power, as is demonstrated by the views of Judith Butler and Slavoj Zizek; though these philosophers both misinterpret Foucault, they nonetheless articulate models in which power produces a resistance that exceeds it.

We have already said enough to dispatch the crude notion that Foucault thinks that resistance is directly produced by power; Butler (1997) produces a more subtle variant of this interpretation, that subjectivity is produced by power, and that this is in turn necessary for resistance. While the extent to which Butler overplays the role of power in forming subjectivity is not in itself that dire, the mistake is magnified when added to her interpretation of resistance. Because Butler sees subjectivity as tied to resistance, she therefore sees our resistance as deriving from this same source, and thus ultimately claims that Foucault "understands resistance as an effect of power" (Butler 1997, 98-99).

Because Butler conceives of the subject not as the fold of someone exercising power over his or her resistant self, but rather as something formed by power which then has the capacity to resist, she sees resistance itself as a capacity created, paradoxically, by power. On our Nietzschean-Deleuzian-Foucaultian understanding of the relation between subjectivity and power, however, it is sub-individual forces that are both bound to resist and to seek to dominate one another. Resistance is not specifically a capacity of All agent: to resist action on our actions, we do not have to be subjects; any animal can resist by refusing to comply. This is not to say that life per se is politically resistant, any more than nature is. However, of animals at least, Nome kind of adaptive resistance can regularly be expected, since in some sense we animals always simply do not want to do quite what we are told to do (see also Kelly 2007, 7H9-90). At least the higher animals have sub-individual drives, moreover, and sub-individuals can and do resist. Resistance is not only what is marshalled by the subject, but indeed something older or deeper encountered internally by subjectivity itself.

Now, when I do resist as a subject, my resistance is thereby more focused. This is a distinction similar to that between resistance and strategic counter-power: subjectivity can marshal sub-individual forces into a dynamically resisting individual, although it may also marshal them into a compliant individual.

This is not to say, however, as Butler does, that "agency is the assumption of a purpose unintended by power, one that could not have been derived logically or historically, that operates in a relation of contingency and reversal to the power that makes it possible, to which it nevertheless belongs" (Butler 1997, 15). We must agree with Butler that "agency exceeds the power by which it is enabled"; we agree that power makes agency possible. However, agency is a relay of power which power does in fact intend, which is part of its intentional strategies, with the attendant risks of more sophisticated resistance; as Foucault says, "the individual has become an essential gamble for power. Power is much more individualising when, paradoxically, it is more bureaucratic and more statist" (DE2 551). This is a key result of Foucault's researches into disciplinary technologies: power increases its level of control by constituting more individualised subjects, who are more concerned with themselves than ever, leading to demands inimical to disciplinary power as traditionally constituted.

However, if we can exercise power over ourselves, then we can, indeed always do, resist ourselves too. This is why subjectivity is itself a matter of government. Of course, the notion of power relations with the self has been most developed in psychoanalysis:

The psychoanalysts, Freud, and many of his successors, ... have, at bottom, tried, like me ... to see how power relations related to what happened in the psychic life of the individual, or in the individual's unconscious, or in the economy of desire … The unconscious constitutes itself starting with a power relation. (DE2 568; d. RC 128)

Slavoj Zizek (1999, 366) claims that "the fact which usually goes unnoticed is that Foucault's rejection of the psychoanalytic account of sexuality also involves a thorough rejection of the Freudian Unconscious." In fact, Foucault was consistent that "although my project, in doing the history of sexuality, is the reverse of that perspective, that is not at all to say that psychoanalysis is mistaken, not at all to say that there is not in our socielies a misunderstanding by the subject of his own desire" (RC 118). Foucault (EW3 3) praises psychoanalysis for calling the subject into question. Foucault (EWl 44) was of course very critical of the operation of the psychoanalytic technique as incorporated into strategies of power, and indeed was critical of it in other respects (see Bernauer 1990 167-169) but this is not to imply a total rejection of it: “I fear very much that [psychoanalysts] will take for an 'anti-psychoanalysis' what will merely be a gt'I1l'alo!J,Y" (PK 192). While Foucault did not see a decisive epistemological brl'ak ill Freud, he nevertheless held the notion of the unconscious in high regard (PK 212-13), indeed making the rejection of the unconscious by Sarlre his main complaint about that thinker (RC 94).

Zizek (1999, 256), for his part, is perhaps unique among Foucaull's critics in accepting himself that resistance is produced by power. Zizek argues, under the influence of Butler, wrongly, that Foucault sees resistance as produced by power but underestimates the radical independence that resistance has from power once it has been produced, that, from the "absolute inherence of resistance to Power, [Foucault] seems to draw the conclusion that resistance is co-opted in advance, that it cannot seriously undermine the system."

The misunderstanding here is fundamental. Foucault never capitalises "power," as Zizek does when discussing Foucault, precisely to avoid such interpretations, if in vain in this case. Struggles do emerge out of the network of power relations much as Zizek himself argues they do: national liberation struggles, the example Zizek discusses, depend on European notions of nationhood, of liberation, on the European ideas imbibed by elites, and these movements do grow beyond these notions implanted by colonialism itself, but the outgrowth is only possible because there was always already resistance. Zizek is simply mistaken that Foucault sees resistance as totally produced by power, and his quasi-Hegelian view that power necessarily produces its opposite, resistance, does not, therefore, trump Foucault. Rather Foucault's position in a way resembles that of Foucault's humanist critics more closely than it does Zizek's, in that Foucault actually sees people as exceeding power and offering resistance, rather than power itself dialectically producing its own supersession. So it is indeed true that Foucault "precludes the possibility that the system itself, on account of its inherent inconsistency, may give birth to a force whose excess it is no longer able to master" (Zizek 1999,256) .

This then is Foucault's position: resistance is sometimes, but not always, power, and power is sometimes, but not always, resistance; though there can be no power without resistance nor resistance without power, neither one produces the other, although in a certain, **ontological sense, resistance may be said to precede power.**

If all resistance is local, "do we. not run the risk of letting ourselves be determined by more general structures outside of our control?" (EW1 316), It's true that the network of power relations cannot be resisted as such. Power as a network must either find a way to ignore/exclude, or must find a way to integrate, everything: "We can always be sure ... that everything that has been created or acquired ,any ground that has been gained will, at a certain moment be used [as a means of social control]… That’s the way of human history” (EW1 166-67). If counter-power remains outside of some structure of power relations in such a way that it becomes its stable counterpart, it can only mean, as we have argued, that it has been incorporated at a meta-level. Resistance can never be total within a social network. Rather, as Foucault says, it is only ever resistance to some specific power relation, which means that this particular agonism can be incorporated into the general network insofar as it becomes regular and predictable. Only the utterly chaotic can escape incorporation, what changes continually without codification or comprehensibility. But, as I have suggested, something that cannot be incorporated, but which nonetheless resists, may be destroyed or ignored, including a geographically isolated social network; in either case, its resistance is ineffective as such. Isolating oneself might be effective as a form of avoiding repression, for example, but not of fighting that repression.

# Alternative – Reject your Truth Claims

**This act of resistance is an ethical –political response – our refusal of the master-narrative of history is act of self-relation which produces a politics which is capable of ethical actions.**

**Kelly** Lecturer in Philosophy at Middlesex University **2009** Mark The Political Philosophy of Michel Foucault p 150-151

Now, Foucault (PE 377) in the same 1983 interview distinguishes ethos from ethics: "ethics is a practice; ethos is a manner of being." While our manner of being may avert catastrophe in the domain of personal political practice, it is not in itself a practice. Foucault effectively suggests combining the philosophical ethos with an ethics counterposed to another practice, politics. Apropos of then-recent events in Poland, the imposition of martial law and imprisonment of dissidents, ethics for Foucault means not accepting what was happening in Poland; despite there being nothing the government of France can do about it, hence no "political" solution, there is an ethical practice of non-acceptance of this state of affairs. This is not critique per se, but it is clearly related to Foucault's conception of critique as not limited by the need to propose an alternative-the difference is that this ethics can be a non-specialised, non-intellectual, mass practice.

Critique is thus allied to an anti-political ethical practice: "The ethicopolitical choice we have to take every day is to determine which is the main danger" (EWI 256). Note that here we are trying to see the greatest danger, not the least of our arrayed evils: we are choosing what to combat, not what to endorse; the intellectual's critique is an indispensable aid to this everyday ethico-political judgement. The ethos and ethics of the critical intellectual belong with the practices we detailed in the previous chapter: the ethos is a manner of being which complements the critical practice of the intellectual and prevents him being pulled into nefarious politics; this ethics is the generalised practice in response to pervasive government by which all those who are governed, citizen-intellectual and citizen simpliciter alike, hold government to account.

The notion of ethos here in particular, however, points in a different direction to that in which the intellectual critical practice points, towards the philosopher's self rather than her world. Although an ethos is not a practice, its inculcation points towards a practice oriented towards the self, towards "ethics" in a different sense of the word to the one we have just outlined. This is the ethics for which Foucault is generally known. In the introduction to the second volume of his History of Sexuality, The Use of' Pleasure, composed in the last years of his life and published only shortly before his death, Foucault defines this ethics as “ethics, understood as the elaboration of a form of self-relation that enables the individual to constitute himself as the subject of a moral conduct” (LP 274; cf. UP 251). While of course we can draw connections between this ethics of subjectivation and the ethics of permanent resistance-Bernauer and Mahon (1994, 144-45) indeed seem to cast the latter notion of ethics as a kind of formative stage of the former, and as we will see, Foucault thinks that effective resistance may ultimately depend on practices of ethical self-relation-they are not straightforwardly the same thing, i.e. Foucault uses the word "ethics" in at least two different senses in his later work.

Ethics is here defined as similarly being a matter of self-relation and subject-constitution. Now, we have argued that the formation of the subject through self-relation is, in Foucaultian terms, "subjectivation," and that this first occurred with the Greeks, which is precisely the context in which Foucault comes to this definition of ethics, on the basis of his examination of ancient Greek ethical thought. This is not to say that ethics is synonymous with subjectivation, but it does seem to be the case historically that subjectivation was invented in the same moment as ethics. As Deleuze (1988, 100-101) puts it in his reading of Foucault, the Greeks "bent the outside, through a series of practical exercises." These practices were, in Greek terms, the tekhne tou biou, the "art of life," one form of which was the epimeleia heautou, the souci de soi, care/concern oflfor the self. They were a set of tools for exercising power over oneself, in a constructive manner. These practices are the armoury of both subjectivation and of ancient Greek ethics. The difference between ethics and self-formation simpliciter is that subjectivation does not logically of itself imply the existence of a moral code, although one might, via a Butlerian/ Lacanian psychoanalytical reading of Foucault, or indeed on the basis of a Nietzschean genealogy of morals, argue that there is a necessary connection between an external code and the formation of subjectivity. Ethics is, on Foucault's above definition, a matter of the articulation of forms of self-relation which mediate the code in producing "the ethical subject" (UP 27)

# Alternative – Reject your Truth Claims

**Our resistance is outside of the notion of politics as war – this epistemology of power structures the totality of the way we know the political which guarantees continued violence**

**Dillon** Prof of Politics at Lancaster **2008** Michael Foucault on Politics, Security and War page 176

A third key point to make about Foucault's formulation of the problematic of modern power and politics is that modern politics, founded historically in war, operates as an extension of war. War is not the extension of politics by other means, says Foucault. Quite the opposite, modern politics is an extension of war. Its very grid of intelligibility continues to extend the operational practices and discursive assumptions of the logos of war into the logos of peace. If race was essential to the early formation of the modern political imaginary in which liberal governance remains implicated so also was war.

Foucault is not saying, as many traditional theorists of political modernity have said, that war is the ontological foundation of political order. His argument is not, at least initially, an ontological, ontopolitical or polemological argument. It is an historical argument. That is how political modernity, the discursive practices and structures of the modern state and of liberal governance in particular, emerged, he says.

This historical argument does have profound epistemological implications, however. If that was how political modernity and modern power relations emerged, then the analytic of modern power relations - how we come to know, interrogate and analyse the operation of modern power - ought then to revolve around its changing historical formations of power rather than the metaphysical arguments concerning, for example, subjectivity, rights and nature which are often advanced, instead, by critics as well as exponents of modern liberal regimes of power. These in turn tend to be micro-practices in which changing understandings and mechanisms of both power and knowledge are intimately allied. Derived from a manifold of changing micro-practices of power/knowledge, liberal biopolitics remains deeply inflected by both its racial and its martial imprint because these articulate its very generative principles of formation and modes of operation. I want, however, to pursue this point about war beyond Foucault in a fourth point concerning the biopolitics of security,

# AT: No Alternative

**Outlining a specific discourse of resistance is a totalitarian means of exercising power: we must outline a broad alternative means of resistance to power**

Pickett 2005

Associate professor of Political Science at Chaldron State College **20**05 [*On the Use and Abuse of Foucault For Politics* pp. 47]

Any reasonable interpretation of Foucaultian resistance will necessarily have a large amount of indeterminacy. While it is non-hierarchical and concerned with memory and the body and the negation of power while still potentially affirmative of something else, these various elements of resistance are compatible with a range of practical political engagements, such as broadly liberal or even anarchist positions. This is because Foucault cannot lay down how or why one should struggle. Such a globalistic theory would become one more agent of power; a totalizing theory is itself "totalitarian."66 Still, it is possible to draw a broad political orientation out of Foucault's celebration of struggle.67 If resistance is worthwhile, as Foucault clearly believes it is, then the conditions which make struggle possible should be fostered. This is why Foucault believes there is a daily "ethico-political" choice to be made.68 We need to decide what constitutes the greatest danger and struggle against it.

From this vantage point it is possible to see why the charge of pessimism or hopelessness that is frequently brought against Foucault is misguided. He is accused of presenting power as something so ubiquitous and overwhelming that all resistance becomes pointless. On the contrary, the fact that everything is dangerous means that there are multiple opportunities for resistance. And far from being pointless, Foucault maintains that engagement presents several possibilities. Resistance gives us the possibility of changing the practices he labels 'intolerables.' Once the asylum inmate, factory worker, or "sexual deviant" is enabled to speak, and his memory of struggles and subjugated knowledge is allowed its insurrection, those who are subjected to power can force change.

# 2AC FRONTLINE – Answers To: Liberalists fears/Reformism

**1- No Link** – We don’t participate in politics of fear.

**2 - Link Turn** – We claim status quo crushes dissent. Your impacts are non-unique, only a risk of al ink turn.

**3 - Perm** – Pass plan and reject the truth claims that you think are bad. Solves case and the criticism.

**4 – Case Outweighs** – Voting affirmative is the only way to solve your impacts.

**5 – Threats are real** – they are spyeing on us. To be obtuse of this fact only allows easier control over populations.

**6 – Alternative Fails –** Biopolitics is to pervasive to “solve’, only actions like the affirmative do something positive.

**7 - Reformism Good –**

Koopman, 8-

Sarah Koopman (Ph.D., political geography) is a feminist political geographer who does collaborative research with international solidarity movements to support their efforts to decolonize the relationships between global North and South. Her work also speaks to dynamics in humanitarianism, development, and peacebuilding more generally.(“Imperialism Within: Can the Master’s Tools Bring Down Empire?”, http://www.acme-journal.org/vol7/SKo.pdf?q=within)//TL

Those of us within the core of empire may think of empire as imposed over ‘there’ on ‘them’, but to effectively struggle against it we have to see how it also affects ‘us’ over ‘here’, and see the imperialism we carry within. The good helper role is one way empire becomes quite intimate. Solidarity activists have used it to try to bring down empire, but this master’s tool is toxic. When we use it we may appear to take tiles off of the master’s house, but we unintentionally reinforce the foundations, the systems of domination that prop up empire. We cannot simply ignore or throw away this tool. The good helper role is too strong a trope, and we continue to slip into these patterns or be read through them. There is no place outside of power, no pure opposition (Butler, 1999). There is no Zion off the grid. The master’s house is taking up all of the land. If we are going to build a new house it has to be on this same plot, and most of our building materials will be recycled from his house. We cannot ignore his tools, or we will constantly trip over them; but we can dismantle and rework them. Changing the good helper tool to become true compas is a constant process. With this modified tool in-the-making we can dismantle the master’s house, and at the same time be building our own. One of the key components of that better world is new ways of relating to others, which requires a new sense of self. As we build these, we also undercut some of the main beams of the master’s house.

*( You should find more cards from your aff file to read here about reformism good/aff can do something positive/ aff hurts the state/ etc…)*